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ARTICLE
AN ANTITRUST-INFORMED APPROACH TO
REGULATING INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
DANIEL A. LYONSt
INTRODUCTION
For over a decade, net neutrality has dominated telecommunications policy.
The debate regarding whether and how to regulate broadband network manage-
ment practices has prompted numerous law review articles,' countless popular
press pieces,2 and several proceedings before the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or the "Commission"). 3 The latest proceeding, in.Decem-
ber 2017, drew a record 23 million comments4 and will send the agency to court
for the fourth time in eight years .5
But net neutrality focuses on only one part of the larger Internet ecosystem.
Advocates targeted broadband networks because of their strategic position as the
gateway to consumers, which potentially positions them to shape the flow of
information online. Yet as former Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski
tAssociate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This paper was supported in part
by the Boston College Law School Fund, which is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks to Jeff
Eisenach, Gus Hurwitz, Mark Jamison, Crystal Lyons, Geoffrey Manne, Randolph May, Da-
vid Olson, Christopher Yoo, David Young, and participants at the Silicon Flatirons Cable
Academic Workshop and Boston College Law School for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions.
' See, e.g., Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 575 (2007).
2 See, e.g., Franklin Foer, It's Time to Regulate the Internet, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20 18/03/its-time-to-regulate-the-in-
ternet/556097/ [https://perma.cc/NDA3-6L37].
3 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018); Protecting and Promoting the
Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order]; Preserving
the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010); Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public
Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,
23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008).
4 Seeid. at504n.1182.
' See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Verizon v. FCC, 740
F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Petition
for Review, New York v. FCC, No. 18-1013 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2018).
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noted, these broadband providers are merely the "onramps" to the Internet6 -
the last mile of a system that brings over 35,000 networks together to move in-
formation packets from origin to destination.
7
Interconnection agreements stitch these networks together. These arms'
length transactions define the terms by which networks exchange traffic with
one another. Through transit agreements, peering relationships, and other com-
mercial arrangements, networks large and small coordinate on a bilateral basis
to deliver Internet content in ways that appear seamless to end user consumers.
But like all contracts, interconnection agreements can be subject to dispute.
Two networks may argue about the terms on which they might enter or renew
an interconnection agreement. The parties may also disagree about their duties
under an existing agreement. If not resolved, these disputes can expose fault
lines between networks that shatter the consumer's illusion of a seamless Inter-
net experience.
As the Internet has matured, some commentators have expressed concern that
these interconnection disputes may similarly threaten the Open Internet. In his
viral 2014 segment on net neutrality, comedian John Oliver highlighted a dispute
during which Comcast allegedly slowed the delivery of Netflix traffic until Net-
flix paid a fee.8 But the Comcast/Netflix dispute was not a net neutrality issue:
Comcast was not blocking, throttling, or prioritizing content on its broadband
network, which is the primary conduct prohibited by the now-defunct net neu-
trality rules.9 Rather, Netflix (and by extension its customers) were trapped by
an impasse in negotiations between Comcast and Cogent Communications, the
company that delivered Netflix's data, regarding the terms by which traffic
would be exchanged and the connections upgraded between the two networks.'
0
It was, in short, an interconnection dispute, which was resolved when Netflix
elected to interconnect directly with Comcast instead of continuing to rely on
Cogent."
but differ in many other ways. If, as some advocates suggest, net neutrality is
analogous to preventing fast and slow lanes on a highway, the Comcast/Netflix
dispute was more like a problem with narrow interchanges between highways.
6 See FCC Republicans Question Need for Net Neutrality Rules, COMM. DAILY (Oct. 23,
2009), https://communicationsdaily.com/article/view?s=207886&id=308522.
7 See CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET: How TECHNOLOGY, USERS, AND
BUSINESSES ARE TRANSFORMING THE NETWORK 55 (2012).
8 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast June 1, 2014). In this
broadcast, Oliver described Comcast's behavior as having "all the ingredients of a mob shake-
down." Id.
9 Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 3, at 17.
10 Zachary M. Seward, The Inside Story of How Netflix Came to Pay Comcast for Internet
Traffic, QUARTZ (Aug. 27, 2014), https://qz.com/256586/the-inside-story-of-how-netflix-
came-to-pay-comcast-for-internet-traffic/ [https://perma.cc/H2XU-HGZ5].
I Id.
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Netflix's slowdown resulted not from how Comcast treated Netflix traffic on its
network, but from difficulties with getting Netflix traffic to the Comcast network
in the first place. Like blocking and prioritization, interconnection denial can be
a tool that companies might deploy for anticompetitive purposes. But the mag-
nitude of this threat, and therefore the appropriate regulatory response, turns
upon market conditions: how competitive are interconnection markets and are
there opportunities for companies to abuse market power in ways that harm con-
sumers?
Of course, interconnection disputes are not a new phenomenon in telecom-
munications law. In the early 1900s, the Bell Telephone System refused to in-
terconnect with rival local telephone companies as a way to maintain its market
dominance, until the Justice Department brought an antitrust action against the
company and forced an interconnection agreement, known as the Kingsbury
Commitment. 12 Similarly, the landmark breakup of the Bell Empire in 1984
originated in part from AT&T's refusal to interconnect with rival long-distance
telephone companies, such as MCI and Sprint.1 3 And the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act imposed a complex interconnection regime upon telephone companies
as part of its effort to stimulate competition for local service.
14
But while the Internet evolved in part from twentieth-century telecommuni-
cations networks, the modem Internet ecosystem differs considerably from its
telephone-based predecessor. Partly in recognition of its lack of familiarity with
this market and partly to avoid allegations of "regulating the Internet," the Com-
mission has waded slowly into these waters and has refrained from asserting
plenary authority over interconnection agreements. The early interconnection
scholarship largely reflects the network architecture of its period and does not
take into account revolutionary changes in modern interconnection markets.
This Article attempts to close that gap and offer a model for interconnection
regulation in the modern era. Part I provides an overview of the interconnection
market and discusses in depth several recent high-profile interconnection dis-
putes, placing these disputes into the broader context of a shifting interconnec-
tion ecosystem. Part II examines the case for regulatory intervention in the in-
terconnection space. Although interconnection markets are robust and
competitive, incentives exist for potentially anticompetitive conduct to occur.
Part II argues that the Commission should act as a sector-specific antitrust au-
thority to safeguard against this risk. Part III examines the mechanics of this
authority: the Commission would intervene in disputes involving "unfair meth-
ods of competition," a standard borrowed from the Federal Trade Commission
Act, and would pursue remedies designed to remedy consumer harm from anti-
competitive interconnection practices. Finally, Part IV explores the need for
12 See Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should Decide
the Future of Telecommunications Regulation? 43 MICH. J. L. REFORM 383, 388 n.16 (2010).
I3 Id. at 389-90 n.27.
'4 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see also Lyons, supra note 12, at 393.
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greater transparency in interconnection markets, and counsels against calls by
some activists to make interconnection agreements publicly available, because
of fear that this disclosure could lead to collusion.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERCONNECTION MARKET
A. Basic Contours
When considering rules for the Internet, the Federal Communications Com-
mission has focused primarily upon the residential broadband market, and to a
lesser extent, the market for commercial end-user broadband access. For exam-
ple, the 2010 Open Internet rules applied only to "broadband Internet access
service," which the Commission defined as "[a] mass-market retail service...
that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or sub-
stantially all Internet endpoints" that is "marketed and sold on a standardized
basis to residential customers, small businesses, and other end-user customers
such as schools and libraries."'15 Similarly, the 2010 National Broadband Plan
announced six long-term goals largely aimed at connecting homes and commu-
nities to broadband networks, consistent with Congress's directive that the
agency "ensure that every American has 'access to broadband capability."" 6 For
years, end-user broadband service has been sold primarily through a subscrip-
tion-based model within which the consumer purchases a publicly-advertised
monthly plan for Internet access. This plan includes either unlimited monthly
service or unlimited service up to a monthly limit, with a per-unit overage charge
for exceeding the customer's allotted consumption.
But upstream into the Internet ecosystem, the interconnection market is much
more comnlex and dynamic. Commentators often describe the Internet. accui-
rately, as a "network of networks."'1 7 Interconnection agreements stitch this net-
work together. Professor Christopher Yoo describes the interconnection market
as a "collection of 35 thousand autonomous systems bargaining with one another
through arms-length transactions" to shuttle traffic among the Internet's end-
points. 18 As one might expect, these agreements inevitably contain wide varia-
tions in the terms under which parties interconnect and exchange traffic with one
another. 19 Interconnection agreements can run hundreds of pages, governing a
15 Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 3, at J 44-45.
16 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, at
xi, xiv-xv (2010).
"7 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 7.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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wide range of conditions, and are typically covered by non-disclosure agree-
ments that reflect the competitively sensitive nature of those terms .20
1. Transit Service
Much of the concern about interconnection agreements, including the Com-
cast/Netflix deal that John Oliver discussed, stems from a misconception that
Internet content providers typically pay nothing to deliver their traffic to the In-
ternet. In fact, these providers often purchase connectivity from one or more
Internet transit providers. 2' In simplified form, Internet transit service is a busi-
ness relationship whereby a network sells Internet access. 22 A content provider
signs an agreement with a transit provider, which agrees to deliver the client's
content to all Internet destinations. The transit provider then enters into inter-
connection agreements with other networks upstream to provide the pathways
required to reach any Internet destination.
Internet transit is typically sold on a metered basis, using the 95th percentile
measurement method.23 Through this method, the transit provider measures the
amount of traffic to or from the customer every five minutes for a month.24 At
the end of the month, each of these samples is converted to a megabit-per-second
figure and the samples are rank-ordered from largest to smallest. 25 The 95th per-
centile figure is used to represent the customer's monthly volume, and is multi-
plied by the transit agreement's per-Mbps unit price to calculate the customer's
monthly bill.26 Many transit providers provide a unit-price discount if the cus-
tomer agrees to a minimum guaranteed amount of monthly traffic, known as a
"commit."27
2. Peering
As an alternative to purchasing transit service from an upstream network, a
network may enter into a peering agreement with another. Peering is a business
relationship in which two companies agree reciprocally to provide access to each
other's customers.28 Traditionally, peering was conducted on a settlement-free
basis, meaning that the two partners agree to exchange traffic without billing one
20 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 58 n.129 (2003).
2' 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at 196.
22 WILLIAM B. NORTON, THE INTERNET PEERING PLAYBOOK: CONNECTING TO THE CORE OF
THE INTERNET 28 (2013).
23 See id. at 30-32.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 id.
27 Id. at 32.
28 Id.
2018]
B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L.
another based on the traffic flow. 29 Many settlement-free peering agreements are
between networks of comparable size, where the flow of traffic in each direction
is roughly equal and therefore the transaction costs of metering would be greater
than the net monthly payout. 30 As Professor Yoo has noted, settlement-free peer-
ing operates as a form of bartering, wherein each network receives an in-kind
benefit of terminating traffic on the counterparty's network roughly equal to the
cost it incurs to accept the counterparty's traffic. 3' When this condition does not
hold, such as between networks where traffic is imbalanced, the parties may
nonetheless sign a paid peering agreement, whereby one party pays the other as
a condition of peering.
32
Peering and transit are related but distinct products. Peering provides a com-
pany access only to the peering partner's end-user customers. It does not guar-
antee that the traffic exchanged will be forwarded on to Internet points that are
not within the peering partner's network. 33 As Norton explains, "Internet Transit
is a service that provides access to the global Internet, while Internet Peering
simply provides a more direct path for a subset of the traffic." 34 Peering may be
advantageous because it is cheaper than the equivalent service, or because direct
access to the peering partner's customers reduces the number of "hops" between
end-points and therefore improves the quality of the transmission by limiting the
risk of congestion or packet loss. 35 Because transit exists as an alternative to
peering, peering behavior is likely disciplined by transit markets as the next-best
alternative.
3. Other Innovations: Content Delivery Networks and Server Farms
Content providers may also choose to rely upon a content delivery network
(CDN) rather than transit or peering to deliver their traffic to the Internet. Like
transit providers, CDNs sell content providers access to the Internet. 36 But rather
than arrange transport across the Internet from the content provider's servers to
consumers trrougn a series oi transit agreements, LkJLiNs maintain a uistriouteo
network of servers around the country, and enter into transit or (typically paid)
29 See Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of "Mission Critical"
Bits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 53 n.17 (2015); Yoo, supra note 7, at 105.
30 Frieden, supra note 29, at 53 n.17; Yoo, supra note 7, at 105.
31 YOO, supra note 7, at 105.
32 Frieden, supra note 29, at 56; Yoo, supra note 7, at 105-108.
33 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at 1 198.
14 NORTON, supra note 22, at 66.
35 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at 198 & n.494 (citing William Norton, The
Evolution of the U.S. Internet Peering Ecosystem, DR. PEERING, http://drpeering.net/white-
papers/Ecosystems/Evolution-of-the-U.S.-Peering-ecosystem.html [https://perma.cc/6T8L-
4Q33] (last visited May 7, 2018)) ("Peering has the benefit of lower latency, better control
over routing, and may therefore lead to lower packet loss.").
36 Id. at T 197.
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peering agreements directly with end-user broadband networks. 37 The CDN
maintains a copy of the client's content on each server, and when requested, will
deliver the content from a server close to the consumer, reducing the distance
that it must travel. 38 Because the content is stored closer to its destination and
traverses fewer interconnections, CDNs can be a high-quality, low-cost alterna-
tive to transit.
39
Some content providers have also begun building server farms to cache and
distribute their content locally. 40 These server farms act like company-owned
CDNs, interconnecting directly with broadband providers and bypassing the
public Internet completely. 4 1 Like CDNs, server farms shorten the pathway from
server to consumer and thus reduce the possibility that congestion will reduce
the quality of the transmission, and also may provide cost savings compared to
traditional transit.42 Professor Yoo notes that Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft
have used server farms to bypass the public Internet for roughly one-third of
their total traffic .43
B. Prices and Competition in Interconnection Markets
As noted above, content providers have a wide range of options to choose
from when deciding how to deliver their content to consumers. Some transit
providers have a nearly global network footprint, while others operate more re-
gionally and rely more heavily on interconnection agreements to route traffic to
end-users. 44 Some providers offer only transit, while others provide a variety of
complementary services as well.45 And as noted above, some content providers
may find peering or CDN delivery to be a competitive alternative to traditional
transit service.
It is also worth noting that content providers and transit providers need not,
and increasingly do not, rely upon a single interconnection agreement to process
their traffic. Rather, many content and transit providers will maintain multiple
pathways through which traffic can reach end users, a practice known as "multi-
homing." 46 By securing multiple pathways to an end-user, multi-homing helps a
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 YOO, supra note 7, at 68.
41 See id.
42 id.
43 Id.
4 See Dan Rayburn, How Transit Works, What it Costs and Why It's So Important,
STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.streamingmedia-
blog.com/2014/02/transit-works-costs-important.html [https://perma.cc/3DQR-M8D6].
45 id.
46 Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture that Challenge the Status
Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 86 (2010).
2018]
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provider offer greater reliability and reduces the market power that a single net-
work may otherwise wield over the flow of Internet traffic.
47
Price trends demonstrate the competitive nature of interconnection markets.
Though pricing schedules are often protected by nondisclosure agreements,
there is a general consensus among analysts that competition has driven down
Internet transit prices precipitously and continuously each year since the Inter-
net's inception. 48 Interconnection consultant William Norton calculates, based
on informal surveys, that the average per-Mbps price for non-commit transit ser-
vice has fallen from $1,200 in 1998 to $12.00 in 2008 and $0.94 in 2014-an
average decline of over 30% each year.49 While Norton notes that the individual
data points are only "rough indications" of price, the "trend is unmistakable, and
no one would disagree."50 Similarly, research firm TeleGeography estimates that
American transit prices have fallen 26% annually from 2007 to 2012, and the
rate of decline is increasing.
5 1
47 Yoo, supra note 7, at 63.
48 NORTON, supra note 22, at 33-34.
49 Id. at 34.
50 id.
51 See IP Transit Price Declines Steepen, TELEGEOGRAPHY (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/201 2/08/02/ip-transit-price-
declines-steepen/ [https://perma.cc/SF9J-PQWR].
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FIGURE 1: Estimated Internet Transit Price
52
Like the transit market, CDN prices are not generally made public, but studies
suggest that these prices are falling at rates roughly comparable to transit
prices. 53 Streaming Media Analyst Dan Rayburn estimates that CDN pricing fell
20-25% from 2012 to 2013, and he expected even greater declines in 2014 and
2015. 54 Given that transit and CDN services are quasi-substitutes, one should
not be surprised to see similar pricing trends in both markets.
C. The Dynamic and Evolving Nature of Interconnection Markets
Moreover, the array of available interconnection services has evolved over
time in response to the growth in the volume and diversity of Internet users,
content, and applications. As Professor Yoo has explained at length, when the
Internet backbone was privatized in the 1990s, the Internet reflected a hierar-
chical structure similar to the traditional telephone network: last-mile networks
serving end-users contracted with regional ISPs, each of which in turn contracted
52 NORTON, supra note 22, at Chapter 2.1.
3 Compare NORTON, supra note 22, at 34 (noting 30% annual decline in transit rates) with
DAN RAYBURN, THE STATE OF THE CDN MARKET (2014), http://conferences.infoto-
day.com/documents/197/2014CDNSummit-Raybum.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX7D-AMWH]
[hereinafter RAYBURN, CDN MARKET] (noting 25% or greater annual decline in CDN rates).
54 See RAYBURN, CDN MARKET, supra note 53.
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with a private backbone provider to carry traffic to the Internet.55 These back-
bone providers interconnected at one of four public peering points to exchange
traffic with one another and route it back down. 56 Traffic thus flowed from the
sender's last-mile provider up to a public peering point, over to another back-
bone provider, then back down again to the last-mile provider serving the recip-
ient .57
But as these standard pathways became congested, network operators sought
alternative agreements, such as private peering and secondary peering agree-
ments to exchange traffic without having to traverse the path through a public
peering point. Today, the old telephone-like hierarchy of the 1990s has been
replaced by a lattice of interconnecting networks that provide multiple potential
pathways for traffic to get from one point to another. The existence of multiple
pathways for any given Internet transmission helps alleviate congestion and
makes the marketplace more competitive, as "the presence of alternative paths
to connect to the Internet naturally limits every market participant's ability to
raise price." 58 In the 2015 Open Internet Order, the Federal Communications
Commission described this evolution graphically:
FIGURE 2: Evolution in Transit Market
59
Transit in the 199fs Paid Peering and CDNs Today
Notably, these innovative new interconnection arrangements coincide with
disruptive changes in interconnection markets or in adjacent content and appli-
cation markets. Norton explains that private peering among cable providers be-
55 Yoo, supra note 7, at 58.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 58-59.
" id. at 63.
'9 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at 5689.
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came necessary following the bankruptcy of the cable industry's primary Inter-
net Service Provider, Excite@Home, in 2001.60 Excite@Home was a joint ven-
ture by multiple cable companies that offered cable subscribers cable modem
service over participating companies' cable networks, coupled long-haul fiber
lines leased from AT&T to regional data storage centers.6 1 In a sense, Ex-
cite@Home was a proto-CDN. But following a disastrous merger with search
engine Excite and the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the combined Ex-
cite@Home company declared bankruptcy. 62 To preserve their cable subscrib-
ers' Internet access, the participating cable companies ultimately agreed to peer
with one another, thus restoring the economies of scale and connectivity that
were available during the Excite@Home era.63 Peering among broadband pro-
viders grew in popularity in the mid-2000s as peer-to-peer networking began
consuming an ever-greater share of total broadband traffic, because settlement-
free peering was more cost-efficient than purchasing transit.
64
Similarly, as the Commission noted, one can trace the rise of CDNs to the
growth in Internet-based video as an increasing share of overall public Internet
traffic. 65 Sandvine estimates that real-time entertainment comprises 2/3 of all
peak time Internet traffic on North American fixed broadband networks.66 Net-
flix alone is responsible for 35.2% of all peak-time fixed broadband traffic, with
YouTube claiming another 17.5%.67 As the Federal Communications Commis-
sion has noted, this content is unusually susceptible to congestion, which drove
demand for alternatives to traditional public Internet transit services.68 By of-
floading this traffic from the public Internet and onto a CDN, an edge provider
can reduce its transit costs and improve its quality of service (by reducing the
hops between server and consumer).69 It is not surprising to find that Netflix,
Google, Amazon, and Apple are among the leading companies in the server farm
space, and that other video content providers are among CDNs' largest custom-
ers.
60 William Norton, Evolution of the U.S. Peering Ecosystem, DRPEERING INTERNATIONAL,
http://drpeering.net/white-papers/Ecosystems/Evolution-of-the-U.S.-Peering-Ecosys-
tern.html [https://perma.cc/5839-LKLQ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
61 See Frank Rose, The $7 Billion Delusion, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2002, 12:00 PM),
www.wired.com/2002/01/excite/ [https://perma.cc/5FYQ-PBPY].
62 id.
63 Norton, Evolution of the U.S. Peering Ecosystem, supra note 60.
64 Id.
65 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3,5 197.
66 SANDVINE, 2016 GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA, LATIN AMERICA AND NORTH AMERICA
4 (2016), https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/archive/2016-global-internet-phe-
nomena-report-latin-america-and-north-america.pdf. Real-time entertainment is comprised of
streaming audio and video. Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 2, 4.
6' 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, T 197.
69 See id.
2018]
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D. Interconnection Disputes: Three Recent Case Studies
Unsurprisingly, given the numerous and myriad types of interconnection ar-
rangements and the dynamic nature of both the interconnection market and the
content markets that it serves, disputes sometimes arise between networks re-
garding the interpretation of existing interconnection agreements and the condi-
tions upon which an agreement should be entered or renewed. Presumably, most
such disputes are resolved privately without the public becoming aware. Below
are a few noteworthy anecdotal case studies that played out in public, thus pull-
ing back the curtain a bit on an otherwise opaque interconnection market.
1. Cogent/Sprint, 2008
Transit provider Cogent Communications experienced several interconnec-
tion disputes in the early 2000s, though the first to garner significant public at-
tention was its 2008 dispute with Sprint.70 Sprint claimed that the parties had
entered into a settlement-free peering agreement, but that Cogent did not meet
the minimum traffic criteria of the agreement.7' As a result, Sprint terminated its
ten interconnection points over a span of three weeks between October 7 and
October 30, 2008 and filed suit alleging breach of contract.72 The action resulted
in a two day period in which Cogent-hosted content was unavailable to Sprint
consumers, before Sprint agreed to restore interconnection pending the outcome
of the litigation.73 The parties settled their dispute and entered a long-term agree-
ment approximately seven weeks later.
74
2. Comcast/Level 3, 2010
While the causes of the Sprint/Cogent conflict are unclear, the Level 3 Com-
munications dispute was unusually public, which allows a rare glimpse into the
dynamics of such situations. Comcast had been a longtime transit customer of
endpoints on networks that do not directly interconnect with Comcast.75 Coin-
cast also peered with Level 3 to exchange traffic bound to and from endpoints
70 See Mark Hachman, Sprint-Cogent 'Net Connections are Back, For Now, PC MAGAZINE
(Nov. 3, 2008, 1:20 AM), https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2333782,0 0 .asp
[https://perma.cc/S8V6-J3SG].
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Dan O'Shea, Sprint Disconnects, Re-Connects with Cogent, FIERCETELECOM (Nov. 3,
2008, 8:49 AM), https://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/sprint-disconnects-re-connects-co-
gent [https://perma.cc/PSG7-5S2W].
71 Press Release, Cogent, Sprint and Cogent Reach Agreement on Exchange of Internet
Traffic (Dec. 22,2008), http://www.cogentco.com/en/news/press-releases/149-sprint-and-co-
gent-reach-agreement-on-exchange-of-internet-traffic [https://perma.cc/ECT4-CKQT].
71 See Nate Anderson, Peering Problems: Digging into the ComcastLevel 3 Grudgematch,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2010, 12:20 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/12/com-
castlevel3/ [https://perma.cc/JQV7-93EE].
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on the Level 3 network (largely business customers). 76 Traditionally, Level 3
was not a significant provider of CDN services, but this changed in 2010 when
Netflix shifted its business to Level 3's CDN.77 As noted above, Netflix has long
been the single biggest source of peak-time Internet traffic: at this time, it was
responsible for approximately 20% of all such traffic. 78 This disrupted the bal-
ance of traffic between networks, as Level 3 was now sending five times as much
traffic to Comcast as it was receiving from Comcast.79 Comcast argued that this
violated the peering agreement, which required a general balance between out-
bound and inbound traffic, and instead billed Level 3 the fee that it charged
CDNs to send traffic to Comcast consumers.8°
Level 3 took the dispute public, issuing a press release decrying Comcast for
"putting up a toll booth at the borders of its broadband Internet access network.
•... 181 Level 3 paid the fee to avoid disruption to customer service, 82 but sought
unsuccessfully to convince the FCC to investigate the issue as part of its review
of the Comcast-NBC Universal merger. 83 The company claimed that Comcast
was blocking Level 3 traffic unless it received a fee for delivery, and that it tar-
geted Level 3 because its primary customer, Netflix, competed directly against
76 Id.
7' Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1781 (2011); see Anderson,
supra note 75.
78 Werbach, supra note 77, at 1780.
79 Id.
80 Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 75. Notably, because the terms of the peering agree-
ment are confidential, it is impossible to determine whether Comcast's claim was true. An-
derson notes, however, that Comcast's public peering policy at the time stated that "[a]ppli-
cant must maintain a traffic scale between its network and Comcast that enables a general
balance of inbound versus outbound traffic." Id.
81 Press Release, Thomas Stortz, Chief Legal Officer, Level 3 Communications, Level 3
Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast's Actions,
http://news.level3.com/news-archive?item=65045&year=-20 10&keywords=com-
cast&FormURL=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.level3.com%2Fnews-archive
[https://perma.cc/QY6C-VLLQ].
82 id.
83 See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, How Comcast Became a Powerful-and Controversial- Part of
the Internet Backbone, ARs TECHNICA (July 17, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/in-
formation-technology/20 14/07/how-comcast-became-a-powerfuI -and-controversial-part-of-
the-iriternet-backbone/3/ [https://perma.cc/4QKR-96EC] (noting that Level 3 and Cogent
asked FCC to intervene in interconnection disputes in 2014 as well); Geoff Duncan, Level 3
Wants Limits on Comcast/NBC Merger, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 17, 2010, 10:02 AM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/level-3-wants-limits-on-comcastnbc-merger/
[https://perma.cc/GL53-3UTH]; Paul Thomasch & Jasmin Melvin, Comcast wins approval
for NBC Universal combination, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2011, 8:25 PM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-nbc-comcast/comcast-wins-approval-for-nbc-universal-combination-
idUSTRE70G66F20110118 [https://perma.cc/SN7E-LLDV].
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Comcast's own video service. 84 These are, of course, reminiscent of the types of
anticompetitive concerns raised in the net neutrality debate. 85 Comcast re-
sponded that the issue was not the content of the traffic but its volume, and that
charging for traffic imbalances was consistent with well-established industry
standards (including Level 3's own position in a previous dispute). 86 Comcast
also noted that as long as transit was available, Level 3 (and its customers) al-
ways have a path available to reach Comcast consumers.87 The conflict appar-
ently continued behind the scenes for years, until on July 16, 2013, the compa-
nies issued a short press release announcing that they "have resolved their prior
interconnect dispute on mutually satisfactory terms. Details will not be re-
leased.'88
3. Comcast/Netflix, 2014
Netflix also lay at the center of perhaps the most public interconnection dis-
pute to date. In February 2014, Netflix announced that it entered a direct inter-
connection agreement with Comcast Corporation.8 9 Though the terms of the
agreement remained confidential, two aspects of the agreement were clear and
unambiguous: Netflix was paying for interconnection and it was unsatisfied with
the terms. In the months following the announcement, Netflix publicly reiterated
the claims that Level 3 had made four years earlier, that Comcast had abused its
position to erect a toll on Internet traffic.90 Netflix released charts purporting to
84 See Duncan, supra note 83.
95q C .- ' _'r lm , ' A
Corp., 23 FCC Red. 13028, lTl 5,27,47 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order) (sanctioning
Comcast's throttling of BitTorrent traffic because of fear of anticompetitive abuse), vacated,
Comcast v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
86 Press Release, J.T. Ramsay, Comcast, Comcast and Level 3: Internet Experts Bring Per-
spective (Dec. 1, 2010), https://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/industry-analysts-
weigh-in-on-comcast-and-level-3 [https://perma.cc/8BDT-EZKC]; Press Release, Joe Waz,
Comcast, Comcast Comments on Level 3 (Nov. 29, 2010), https://corporate.com-
cast.com/comcast-voices/comcast-comments-on-level-3 [https://perma.cc/KZL5-PZL7].
87 See Anderson, supra note 75.
88 Press Release, Level 3 Communications, Level 3 and Comcast Issue Statement (July 16,
2013), http://news.leve]3.com/news-archive?item= 136853 [https://perma.cc/U4B2-UFA6].
89 Zachary Seward, The Inside Story of How Netflix Came to Pay Comcast for Internet
Traffic, QUARTZ (Aug. 27, 2014), https://qz.com/256586/the-inside-story-of-how-netflix-
came-to-pay-comcast-for-internet-traffic/ [https://perma.cc/AG83-NRS6].
90 Sam Hollister, Netflix Accuses Comcast of Charging Twice for the Same Internet Con-
tent, THE VERGE (Apr. 14, 2014, 4:40 PM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2014/4/24/5650406/netflix-accuses-comcast-of-double-dipping-with-isp-toll
[https://perma.cc/F353-FXGU].
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show that Comcast slowed delivery of Netflix traffic to Comcast consumers dur-
ing the months leading to the agreement, thereby degrading the Netflix experi-
ence as a negotiating tactic.
9'
Coming just as the FCC opened a new debate on net neutrality rules, Netflix's
charges were incendiary. Advocates, most notably John Oliver, seized on the
dispute as evidence supporting the need to enact net neutrality rules 92-alt-
hough, as noted above, the interconnection agreement did not implicate the
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization bans that lay at the core of the pro-
posed rule. 93 Moreover, Comcast was already subject to net neutrality re-
strictions as a condition of the NBC Universal merger back in 2010. 94 Netflix
lobbied the Commission repeatedly to regulate interconnection as part of the
Open Internet order-a quest that was ultimately successful, at least in part-
and net neutrality advocates used this issue to call for greater transparency in
interconnection markets, and specifically the public disclosure of interconnec-
tion agreements.95
9' Juliana Reyes, This Graph Shows How Netflix Speeds Changed After Comcast Deal,
TECHNICALLY PHILLY (May 9, 2014, 7:30 AM), https://technical .ly/philly/2014/05/09/graph-
shows-netflix-speeds-changed-comcast-deal-comcast-roundup/ [https://perma.cc/NWJ5-
ZWWS].
92 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 8.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
94 Georg Szalai, Regulators Approve Comcast-NBC Universal Deal with Conditions, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 18, 2011, 10:59 AM), https://www.hollywoodre-
porter.com/news/regulators-approve-comcast-nbc-universal-72809 [https://perma.cc/9PBR-
XZR2]. Netflix never brought a complaint that Comcast's conduct violated the merger con-
ditions, nor did it publicly allege facts that would have suggested Comcast had done so.
9' See, e.g., Public Knowledge, Benton Foundation, & Access Sonoma Broadband, Com-
ment Letter on 2015 Open Internet Order, at 114 (July 15, 2014) https://ecf-
sapi.fcc.gov/file/7521480282.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N49-PVD6] ("The Commission must
push for further public transparency surrounding interconnection agreements."); Public
Knowledge & Common Cause, Comment Letter on Remand of 2015 Open Internet Order, at
10 (Mar. 21, 2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521094713.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WFE-
L6MQ]; Brian Fung, The FCC is Going to Scrutinize Netflix's Deals with Comcast, Verizon-
and Others Too, WASH. POST: SWITCH BLOG (June 13, 2014), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/06/13/the-fcc-is-going-to-scrutinize-netflixs-deals-
with-comcast-verizon-and-others-too/?utm term=.a580fea7279a [https://perma.cc/53ZN-
NZXW] ("Netflix's continued dispute with Internet providers underscores that we can't de-
clare a winner in the debate without more information about what Netflix is paying Comcast
and Verizon to boost customers' streaming speeds, whether that's causing people's bills to
rise, and who actually has the leverage in these relationships."); Stacey Higginbotham, The
Netflix-Comcast Agreement Isn't a Network Neutrality Violation, But It is a Problem,
GIGAOM (Feb. 24, 2014, 5:37 PM), https://gigaom.com/2014/02/23/the-netflix-comcast-
agreement-isnt-a-network-neutrality-violation-but-it-is-a-problem/ [https://perma.cc/L65U-
YNAF]("Just open these contracts up to industry and public scrutiny."). See also NICK Russo
ET. AL., OPEN TECH. INST., THE COST OF CONNECTIVITY 2014 34 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.newamerica.org/documents/940/the-cost-of-connectivity-2014.pdf (noting with
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But the complete story is perhaps more nuanced than Netflix's advocacy sug-
gested. Streaming media expert Dan Rayburn suggested that the decline in Net-
flix speeds on Comcast's network was not a deliberate negotiation tactic, but
instead the byproduct of an earlier interconnection dispute between Comcast and
Netflix's primary CDN at the time, Cogent.96 For over a year, Cogent had been
locked in a very public peering dispute with Verizon. 97 Like the Level 3 dispute
four years earlier, the driver appeared to be Cogent's decision to host Netflix
content, which dramatically increased the volume of traffic flowing from Cogent
to broadband networks. 98 In Verizon's case, the increased volume of Verizon-
bound traffic exceeded the capacity of the existing connections between the Co-
gent and Verizon networks. 99 Cogent and Verizon reached an impasse over the
cost of upgrading these connections and the transit fees, if any, that Cogent
should pay for the increased volume. 0 0 In the meantime, Cogent's customers,
including Netflix, began suffering delays due to the dispute, as congested inter-
connection nodes slowed the rate of delivery of Netflix traffic to consumers.
10'
Rayburn suggested that a similar dispute is likely responsible for the decline in
the quality of Netflix quality to some Comcast customers. 0 2 Cogent's CEO later
confirmed this was the case, noting that the additional traffic overwhelmed the
existing interconnection points and that Comcast refused to add capacity to ad-
just for the increased volume. 03 In a 254-page filing with the FCC, Netflix ad-
mitted that it had purchased all available transit capacity from providers that did
not pay a fee to Comcast. 10 4 Its traffic was simply too great to fit the existing
interconnection paradigms.
Faced with this reality, Netflix's decision to interconnect directly with Coin-
cast seems like a rational business decision. Rather than suffer collateral damage
approval that "In Seoul, SK Telecom lists its interconnection agreements on its website, a
Practice which increases transparencv about the network.").
96 See Dan Rayburn, Here's How the Comcast & Netflix Deal is Structured, With Data &
Numbers, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 27, 2014), https://seekingalpha.com/article/2059363-heres-
how-the-comcast-and-netflix-deal-is-structured-with-data-and-numbers
[https:Hperma.cc/SN29-BHEH] [hereinafter Rayburn, Comcast & Netflix].
97 See Jon Brodkin, Verizon and Cogent Settle Differences, Agree to Boost Internet Qual-
ity, ARs TECHNICA (May 1, 2015, 1:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technol-
ogy/2015/05/verizon-and-cogent-settle-differences-agree-to-boost-internet-quality/
[https://perma.cc/SJ92-RGYN].
98 See id.
99 See David Young, Unbalanced Peering, and the Real Story Behind the Verizon/Cogent
Dispute, VERIZON (June 19, 2013), http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/unbalanced-
peering-and-the-real-story-behind-the-verizon-cogent-dispute [https://perma.cc/525M-
FTNQ].
'00 Id.; Brodkin, supra note 97.
'o' Brodkin, supra note 97.
02 See Rayburn, Comcast & Netflix, supra note 96.
103 See Seward, supra note 89.
104Id.
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from Cogent's ongoing dispute with Comcast, Netflix cut out the middleman
and reduced the number of "hops" between its servers and its customers. More-
over, it is an arrangement the company anticipated: over the preceding two years,
Netflix had invested over $100 million to build OpenConnect, a proprietary net-
work to deliver Netflix content as an alternative to the public Internet.'0 5 In es-
sence, OpenConnect is a single-purpose CDN, designed exclusively to deliver
Netflix content to broadband networks. 0 6 The Comcast agreement was not the
first direct interconnection agreement Netflix signed, although it was likely the
first to require payment. Netflix appears to have hoped to negotiate settlement-
free peering agreements with broadband providers. It succeeded with some net-
works, though Comcast (and soon thereafter Verizon, AT&T, and others) nego-
tiated a paid peering arrangement instead.10 7 But notably, this fee did not repre-
sent an additional cost on Netflix's balance sheet; rather, the company merely
shifted transit costs from one network to another.
II. THE CASE FOR (LIMITED) REGULATORY INTERVENTION
One takeaway from the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's 2014
#CommActUpdate project is that numerous scholars agree the Commission
should assume some oversight of the interconnection market. 10 8 Interconnection
is central to the Internet's very existence.' 0 9 Kevin Werbach states that "the core
threat to the internet is the potential erosion of robust interconnection, creating
a balkanized environment in which innovation opportunities are circum-
scribed."11 0 Denser, more interconnected networks help promote the Internet as
a tool for expression, news, education, and communication-all socially valua-
ble activities that public policy should facilitate.
'05 Kevin Werbach, Reflections on Network Transitions and Social Contracts for the
Broadband World, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 45, 68-69 (2015); Seward, supra note 10.
106 HOW Netflix Works With ISPs Around the Globe to Deliver a Great Viewing Experience,
NETFLIX MEDIA CTR. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://media.netflix.com/en/company-blog/how-net-
flix-works-with-isps-around-the-globe-to-deliver-a-great-viewing-experience
[https://perma.cc/R6CN-QFPM].
'07 Seward, supra note 10.
108 See, e.g., FREE STATE FOUNDATION, RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE COMMERCE
COMMITEE'S FOURTH WHITE PAPER 2-3 (2014) (explaining that "there is still a useful role
for a government regulator to play in overseeing the interconnection of the various privately-
operated networks that comprise the nation's communications infrastructure"). Both that re-
sponse and this article acknowledge a debt to the substantial work previously done on this
topic by the Digital Age Communications Act Working Group. See RANDOLPH J. MAY ET AL.,
PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION, DIGITAL AGE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, PROPOSAL OF THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WORKING GROUP 4, 18-19, 25 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/other/050617regframework.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8D8-NUSG].
109 See, e.g., James Speta, An Appropriate Interconnection Backstop, 12 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 113, 114 (2014).
"0 Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1236 (2007).
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Moreover, as in many areas of the economy, interconnection markets contain
some incentives for anticompetitive abuse. There are many benign reasons why
one network may refuse to interconnect with another-perhaps most obviously,
to pressure a sending network into assuming the direct or indirect costs of of-
floading its traffic onto a receiving network. But some networks may also be
tempted to deny interconnection as a strategy to restrict competition in ways that
harm consumers. For example, large network A may deny interconnection to
smaller network B as a way to prevent network B's customers from reaching
endpoints on A's network, with the ultimate goal of luring B's customers to A's
network instead. Indeed, this is one way the Bell Telephone System monopo-
lized local telephone service in the early twentieth century.' As discussed be-
low, networking innovations have reduced the opportunities for such behavior
in Internet interconnection markets. Nonetheless, the potential for this abuse
suggests the need for some regulatory oversight.
But unlike other areas of the economy, it is unclear whether the traditional
antitrust approach is sufficient to remedy interconnection concerns. Historically,
antitrust law effectively policed interconnection abuses in telephone markets-
arguably more effectively than Commission oversight."' But the Supreme
Court's landmark Trinko decision 1 3 has cast some doubt upon antitrust law's
usefulness going forward as a tool to police interconnection disputes." 4 In
Trinko, the plaintiff alleged that Verizon Communications denied interconnec-
tion to plaintiff's local telephone company, a Verizon rival, as a way to limit
entry to the telephone market. 1 5 The Court recognized, and affirmed, its earlier
111 When Alexander Graham Bell's patent on the telephone expired in 1894, his company
(AT&T) faced competition from new, independent telephone companies. To maintain domi-
nance, AT&T refused interconnection with these new companies when their networks over-
__pp6 . AT&T , .Se Stee$c G. ',, & ,6 Z L ,, , ," i '_ t .L ,
United States: A Focus on Mobile Communications, 62 FED. CoMM. L.J. 119, 123-24 (2010).
Notably, AT&T "was aggressive" in pursuing interconnection agreements with networks that
did not overlap AT&T service areas. Id. at 124 n.21. The company's behavior prompted an
antitrust suit which was settled by the 1914 Kingsbury Commitment, under which AT&T
agreed to interconnect its state-of-the-art long distance network with independent local tele-
phone companies. Id. at 124; Lyons, supra note 12, at 388 n. 16. But the Kingsbury Commit-
ment was only partially successful, as it did not require AT&T to interconnect its local net-
works with independent rivals, which allowed AT&T to continue using interconnection to
disadvantage- and ultimately acquire-local rivals. See Geoffrey M. Peters, Is the Third
Time the Charm? A Comparison of the Government's Major Antitrust Settlements with AT&T
This Century, 15 SETON HALL. L. REV. 252, 255-56 & n.23 (1985).
"1
2 See Jon Sallet, A Brief History of Competition Policies and Networks, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (Sep. 5, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-
events/blog/2014/09/05/brief-history-competition-policies-and-networks
[https://perma.cc/QHN3-DLLR].
113 Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
14 Id. at 415; see also Speta, supra note 109, at 119-22.
115 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
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cases1 16 establishing a refusal-to-deal claim under certain circumstances. 17 But
it noted these cases were narrow exceptions to the general right of a company to
determine with whom it will deal, and on what terms, and rejected Trinko's
claim that Verizon had a duty here. 1 8 The decision neither affirmed nor rejected
the essential facilities doctrine, which imposes on monopolists liability for deny-
ing a competitor access to a resource necessary to compete in a market, 19 but it
suggested that "forced access" - that is, granting a competitor access to the
defendant's facilities - was not an appropriate remedy, at least in this case,
where the Telecommunications Act provided a complex regulatory scheme that
governs interconnection between local telephone companies.120
Giving the Commission explicit oversight of interconnection markets can ad-
dress any potential ambiguity that arises under Trinko. As Trinko itself notes,
"[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and cir-
cumstances of the industry at issue." 121 As a sector-specific antitrust authority,
the Commission can develop expertise with regard to interconnection markets
and can outline the contours of how a refusal-to-deal doctrine might operate in
the unique context of a networked industry, without risking erosion of the gen-
eral right to contract that Trinko sought to protect. It also would allow the Com-
mission to wield a forced access remedy as a solution to an interconnection dis-
pute, even if, as Trinko suggests, this remedy would not be available under
traditional antitrust law.
While the Commission has a role to play, it should approach intervention with
caution. When the Commission first sought to regulate in this area, as part of the
2015 Open Internet Order, it admitted that the Commission does not yet have a
firm understanding of the complexities of interconnection markets.122 But based
on the discussion thus far, one can identify three broad themes with certainty.
First, interconnection markets are complex. As noted above, there are over
35,000 networks that comprise the Internet.123 Some have a global footprint,
while others operate only locally. Some offer only transit service, while others
bundle delivery with other products and services. Thus, the universe of potential
"6Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
117 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-10.
"'18 Id. at 408 ("Thus, as a general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not restrict the long rec-
ognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.") (quoting
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
119 See, e.g., John T. Soma et al, The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated Tel-
ecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 565, 580 (1998).
120 See generally 47 U.SC. § 251 (2012); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411; Frank X. Schoen, Ex-
clusionary Conduct After Trinko, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1625, 1643 & n.105 (2005).
121 Id. at 399.
122 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, 31.
123 See YOO, supra note 7.
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interconnection agreement terms is vast, providing a steep learning curve for
regulators and a high potential for error.
Second, interconnection markets are competitive. Content providers have a
wide variety of transit and other providers to choose from when determining
how to get content to the Internet, and transit networks have myriad options to
deliver their traffic to its final destinations. The significant, consistent declines
in Internet transit 124 and CDN prices 25 evince the competitiveness of these mar-
kets: even at razor-thin margins, the downward pressure on prices shows no sign
of abating.
Finally, interconnection markets are evolving, largely in response to evolu-
tionary trends elsewhere in the Internet ecosystem. The Open Internet order rec-
ognized this phenomenon. 26 The rise of streaming video as the dominant form
of Internet traffic has disrupted traditional transit and peering arrangements. The
asymmetric flow of video traffic and rise of CDNs as an alternative to traditional
transit has put pressure on network providers to adapt interconnection arrange-
ments to meet these new realities. Sometimes this adaptation requires abandon-
ing traditional interconnection patterns to meet the challenges presented by new
and different traffic patterns.
This is the challenge for the Commission as an interconnection regulator: it
should intervene when there is credible evidence of anticompetitive threats, but
without distorting the natural evolution of interconnection markets or retarding
the ability of networks to adapt to stimuli elsewhere in the Internet ecosystem.
The challenge is compounded by the fact that market evolution is often messy
and has adverse interim consequences for consumers. But the Commission must
resist the urge to label each consumer disruption a market failure in need of reg-
ulatory intervention.
III. TOWARD A MORE CONCRETE INTERCONNECT1ON GOVERNANCE REGIME
This section sketches the outline of a regime within which the Commission
may assess interconnection disputes. It examines the Commission's first, fitful
attempt pursuant to the 2015 Open Internet Order. Using that flawed model as a
jumping-off point, it discusses a better approach nestled within the broader tran-
sition of telecommunications markets away from the heavily regulated common
carriage regime of the twentieth century and toward an antitrust-based approach
more commensurate with today's competitive market structure.
A. Interconnection and the Open Internet Order
In the 2015 Open Internet Order, the Commission claimed authority to regu-
late broadband providers' interconnection agreements based upon its decision to
124 NORTON, supra note 22, at 34.
125 RAYBURN, CDN MARKET, supra note 53.
126 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, T 196.
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reclassify broadband as a Title II telecommunications service.1 27 During this re-
classification period, broadband providers were prohibited by Sections 201 and
202 from engaging in unjust or unreasonable practices when providing broad-
band service to consumers.' 28 The order interpreted this duty to extend to the
exchange of Internet traffic by an edge provider or an intermediary with the
broadband provider's network.' 29 These exchanges of traffic, governed by in-
terconnection agreements, are provided "for and in connection with" broadband
service and therefore fell within the Commission's purview.
30
Interestingly, the order did not explicitly rely upon the portions of Title II that
specifically govern interconnection (the statutes implicated in the Trinko case).
The Commission forebeared from applying Sections 251 (a)(1) and 251 (c)(2),131
which requires telecommunications carriers to interconnect directly or indirectly
with one another and foists additional obligations on incumbent local exchange
carriers. 32 The Commission did not forbear from applying Section 201(a), 133
which on its face gives the Commission authority to order interconnection if the
public interest so demands.1 34 In light of its explicit statement that Section 201
applied to broadband providers, the order at least implicitly suggested that this
interconnection authority was available to the Commission. But throughout the
discussion of interconnection, the order relied primarily upon the Section 201 (b)
duty to avoid unjust and unreasonable practices rather than Section 201(a)'s
more general duty to interconnect in the public interest.
135
But the order took a self-consciously slow approach to interconnection regu-
lation. The Commission explicitly declined to impose the full panoply of net
127 Id. T 196.
12847 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2012).
129 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, 5 195.
130 Id. 204 (quoting § 201(b)).
's See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2012).
132 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, 1 513-14. It is also not clear how much au-
thority these statutes would give the Commission to regulate the terms of interconnection.
Section 251 imposes a duty to interconnect, but it generally leaves the parties discretion to
negotiate the terms of that agreement, subject to mediation and compulsory arbitration con-
ducted upon request by state public utility commissions in accordance with Section 252. Sec-
tion 251(c)(3) imposes on incumbent local exchange carriers (those offering local telephone
service before the 1996 Telecommunications Act) a duty to interconnect on just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory terms.
I3 3 Id. 449.
114 § 201(a) ("It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio to furnish such communications service upon reasonable
request therefor; and in accordance with the orders of the Commission, in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or desirable in the
public interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers, to establish through
routes and charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and
provide facilities and regulations for operating such through routes.").
135 See, e.g., 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, 11203-04.
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neutrality provisions to a broadband provider's interconnection practices, such
as the prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization. 136 Nor did it
apply the catch-all no unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard to inter-
connection agreements. 137 As noted above, the Commission recognized that it
lacked the experience and background necessary to craft specific rules govern-
ing Internet traffic exchange. 13 8 Instead, it planned to develop its interconnection
jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis in response to claims filed with the Com-
mission under Section 208 alleging that broadband providers are engaged in un-
just or unreasonable practices. 139
There were two potential problems with this approach. First, it was incom-
plete. As noted above, the Commission grounded its authority on broadband
providers to provide just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory service to consum-
ers.140 This meant that the Commission's authority extended only to complaints
by other networks against broadband providers. But it did not allow broadband
providers to bring complaints against other networks, nor did it include disputes
between intermediate networks that did not provide broadband access to end-
user consumers. 41 As the Commission noted, the imposition of a "one-sided
interconnection duty upon last-mile ISPs" could adversely impact interconnec-
tion negotiations, as it "unjustifiably provided edge providers, many of whom
are sophisticated entities with significant market power due to high demand for
their content, with additional leverage in negotiating interconnection."'' 42 This
was especially problematic in rural areas, where "many ISPs are a tiny fraction
of the size of upstream middle mile and transit networks or content and edge
providers."
14 3
Second, the requirement that any interconnection practices be just and reason-
able was vague and provided little guidance to networks seeking to interconnect.
The Commission's prior telephone interconnection decisions are largely inap-
posite, as they involve different market conditions and a more comprehensive
136 Id. Tl 30,195.
137Id. 195.
13 81d. 202.
139 /d. 203.
14 0 /d. 202.
141 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 3, TJ 169 ("Returning to the pre-Title II
Order light-touch framework will also eliminate the asymmetrical regulatory treatment of
parties to Internet traffic exchange arrangements. As NTCA explains, the Title II Order im-
posed a one-sided interconnection duty upon last-mile ISPs...").
142 Id. ("We anticipate that eliminating one-sided regulation of Internet traffic exchange and
restoring regulatory parity among sophisticated commercial entities will allow the parties to
more efficiently negotiate mutually-acceptable arrangements to meet end user demands for
network usage.").
14 3 id.
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regulatory regime that does not apply to broadband providers. 144 Understanda-
bly, the agency sought to flesh out its standard over time on a case-by-case basis.
But the Commission noted that during the two years that the Open Internet order
was in effect, "the new case-by-case dispute process has gone unused" even as
Internet-based video distributors, "which ISPs presumably might view as com-
petitors to affiliated video programming products or services[,] have prolifer-
ated. ' 145 In fact, the Commission did process one complaint brought under the
interconnection rule. In June 2015, Commercial Network Services brought an
informal complaint after Time Warner Cable refused its request to peer on a
settlement-free basis.146 Oddly, the company alleged that the refusal violated the
prohibition on throttling and paid prioritization, rather than invoking the "just
and reasonable" interconnection standard, and perhaps for this reason, the En-
forcement Bureau closed the complaint without taking action, leaving no case
law with which to interpret what actions might be unjust or unreasonable.
147
The Commission's brief experiment with interconnection regulation ended in
2018, when the Restoring Internet Freedom Order repealed the 2015 Open In-
ternet Order and restored broadband providers' classification as a Title I infor-
mation service. 148 The 2018 Order explicitly refuted the agency's justification
for regulating interconnection markets under Title II and instead returned to the
pre-2015 status quo.149 Instead the Commission found that competitive pressures
144 Section 251 imposes a general duty on telecommunications carriers to interconnect with
one another to exchange voice telephone traffic, as part of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act's attempt to infuse competition into monopoly local telephone markets. 47 U.S.C. § 251;
see supra note 132 and accompanying text. It imposes further obligations on incumbent local
exchange carriers regarding how to interconnect and on what terms. § 251. The Act contains
detailed procedures under which telecommunications carriers would contract for interconnec-
tion, including providing for mediation by state public utility commissions, and mandatory
arbitration of outstanding disputes by those commissions if invoked between the 135th and
160th day following commencement of negotiations. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2012).
145 Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 3, l 168. ("Indeed, the new case-by-case dispute
process has gone unused, even as OVDs -which ISPs presumably might view as competitors
to affiliated video programming products or services-have proliferated.").
146 See Letter from Barry Bahrami, CEO, Commercial Network Services, to Federal Com-
munications Commission (June 22, 2015), https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/06/22/cns.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RXC6-GLYT]. Time Warner Cable refused settlement-free peering because
CNS did not meet the company's peering policy, presumably because its webcam service
created a traffic imbalance. TWC offered to enter a transit agreement instead but CNS found
this financially unfeasible. Id.
'
47 See Alan Galloway, FCC Appears to Decline Action on Edge Provider's Informal Com-
plaint, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP: OPEN INTERNET LAW ADVISOR (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.openinternetlaw.com/2015/10/fcc-appears-to-decline-action-on-edge-provid-
ers-informal-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/ERS5-BSZ3].
48 Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 3, T 54.
149 Id. $ 166.
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in the interconnection market are sufficient to mitigate the risk of anticompeti-
tive abuse,"1 0 and that antitrust and consumer protection laws provide sufficient
redress for potential misconduct.
51
B. Standard for Intervention
The current Commission has thus placed its faith in traditional antitrust law
to remedy potential abuses in the interconnection market. In doing so, the agency
recognized the potential difficulties noted earlier that Trinko might pose for re-
fusal-to-deal claims. 152 The Order reasoned that while antitrust law may provide
incomplete protection, retention of the Commission's Title II authority as a rem-
edy would do more harm than good.15 3 The Commission also noted that the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's Section 5 authority may reach beyond traditional anti-
trust and may thus serve as a backstop despite Trinko.1
54
But the public would be better served by a Commission that retained authority
over interconnection disputes, albeit in a more limited capacity than the Open
Internet order provided. First, the Commission's binary choice between no reg-
ulation and Title II common carriage is a function of the existing statute, which
was last updated in 1996 and is woefully out-of-date (which explains why issues
such as net neutrality have become so fluid and politicized). 155 A Communica-
tions Act update could, and should, give the Commission an explicit, narrow
grant of authority over interconnection disputes as part of a revision to clarify
the Commission's jurisdiction over IP network management practices. Moreo-
ver, while the Restoring Internet Freedom Order is correct that the FTC's Sec-
tion 5 authority could serve as a backstop, an FCC approach would be preferable.
If, as Trinko suggests, "[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the partic-
ular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue,"'156 the public interest
150 Id. J 170.
15 1 Id. J 172.
1
12 Id. l 166 n.556.
153id.
154 id.
155 It is also, to an extent, a function of the Commission's interpretation of that statute. The
Commission could assert jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act to regulate
interconnection agreements if it found that regulation was ancillary to some grant of authority
elsewhere in the statute. One such candidate would be Section 706, which requires the Com-
mission to encourage the timely deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706(a), 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); see
also Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next
Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 41, 47 n.24 (2003). But the Com-
mission has interpreted Section 706 as merely a statement of Congressional policy rather than
an affirmative grant of authority. See Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 3, T 500.
156 Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 399
(2004).
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would be better served by a body well-versed in the unique characteristics of
telecommunications markets.
Having acknowledged the desirability of giving the Commission authority,
the next question becomes when the Commission should intervene in an inter-
connection dispute. The law should adopt an intervention standard informed by
competition law principles, commensurate with the notion that anticompetitive
concerns comprise the primary justification for regulating in this space. This
Article proposes that the Commission be given statutory authority to intervene
to prevent "unfair methods of competition" in interconnection markets. This
standard, borrowed from Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ac-
cords with the Restoring Internet Freedom Order's faith in Section 5 as an ap-
propriate backstop to govern interconnection disputes.1
57
Importantly, an "unfair methods of competition" standard reaches somewhat
further than a traditional antitrust claim. 158 In a typical anticompetitive foreclo-
sure case, the government must prove that the defendant has market power and
that the conduct in question has an anticompetitive effect. 159 One would expect
many meritorious interconnection claims to fall into this category. But by reach-
ing further than a traditional Sherman or Clayton Act claim, the unfair method
of competition standard alleviates the concern that Trinko would otherwise fore-
close those claims. And it leaves room for the Commission to investigate refusal
to interconnect claims by networks that lack market power but might nonetheless
impede competition. 16o
Of course, importing the "unfair methods of competition" standard raises the
question of how much further the standard reaches- a question that courts, reg-
ulators, and scholars have debated with regard to the FTC Act for decades. 161 In
the 1972 FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Company decision, 62 the Supreme
Court suggested that Section 5 could reach conduct that violated "either the letter
117 Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 3, 139-41.
'
58
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION T 302h, at 21-27 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining
FTC Act Section 5 is not limited to the violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
9 See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 ("To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the posses-
sion of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element
of anticompetitive conduct." (emphasis in original)).
16 0 Cf. Alfred Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transition from Regulation to Antitrust, 5 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 159, 166-67 (2006) (criticizing the Digital Age Communica-
tions Act's restriction of "unfair competition" to instances of abuse of market power). As
Kahn notes, the Digital Age Communications Act would have generally tethered the FCC's
regulatory authority to a market power analysis, but softened this standard with regard to
interconnection claims. See id. at 165 n.17.
161 See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust, 76
U. PIr. L. REV. 209,247 (2014) ("The extent of Section 5 - in particular, whether it is broader
than or bounded by the antitrust laws- has been a topic of intense debate in recent years.").
162405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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or the spirit of the antitrust laws,"'1 63 conduct that could be an "incipient" viola-
tion,1 64 or perhaps even conduct that violates "public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws."' 65 But
by the 1980s, consistent with the influence of the Chicago School on antitrust
doctrine, courts and the Federal Trade Commission curtailed Section 5 to reach
only conduct with an actual adverse effect on competition. 66 More recent FTC
actions have cautiously asserted a more expansive Section 5 authority, 167 though
leading scholars recognize that there remains "a fundamental difficulty in dis-
tinguishing an antitrust offense under FTC Act [section] 5 from that under the
Sherman or Clayton Acts."'
168
Fortunately, the Federal Trade Commission recently enacted several princi-
ples to guide the exercise of its Section 5 powers, which provides some useful
guideposts. 169 The FTC explained that when deciding to challenge an action un-
der its Section 5 authority:
* the Commission will be guided by the public policy underlying the
antitrust laws, namely, the promotion of consumer welfare;
* the act or practice will be evaluated under a framework similar to
the rule of reason, that is, an act or practice challenged by the Com-
mission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to competition or
163 Id. at 239.
164 Id. at 243.
161 id. at 244. Importantly, the Court did not clarify whether it was interpreting the "unfair
methods of competition" or the "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" prong, as the FTC
charged the case under both prongs. Id. at 235.
166 See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
"' Zee, e.g., I ne v ons k-ompanies trm i komplamts & uruers 196 /-19 5 i anster ilnuerj
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23, 200 (FTC Aug. 7, 1992) (consent decree) (asserting Section 5
violation through two transactions, neither one of which violated Clayton Act on a standalone
basis); In Re Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120, 2013 WL
124100 (Jan. 3, 2013) (consent decree) (finding interference with standard-setting organiza-
tion constituted unfair method of competition); but see id. (Dissenting Statement of Commis-
sioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen) ("I question whether such conduct, standing alone, violates
Section 5... I decline to join in another undisciplined expansion of Section 5."). See generally,
Thomas Dahdouh, Section 5, The FTC and Its Critics: Just Who Are the Radicals Here? 20
COMPETITION: J.ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1 (2011) (collecting cases).
168 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 156, at 22.
169 See Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding "Unfair Methods of Competition"
Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 57055,57056 (Sept. 21,2015). These standards
reflect the work of antitrust professor and former FTC Commissioner, Joshua Wright, who
stated one of his goals as Commissioner was to bring more guidance to the agency's Section
5 enforcement authority. See Bona Law PC, Section 5 of the FTC Act and Commissioner
Joshua Wright: Mission Accomplished?, THE ANTITRUST ATT'y BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015),
https ://www.theantitrustattorney .com/2015/09/16/section-5-of-the-ftc-act-and-commis-
sioner-joshua-wright-mission-accomplished/ [https://perma.cc/RL9S-C6CB].
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the competitive process, taking into account any associated cog-
nizable efficiencies and business justifications; and
* the Commission is less likely to challenge an act or practice as an
unfair method of competition on a standalone basis if enforcement
of the Sherman or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the compet-
itive harm arising from the act or practice.
170
Consistent with this statement, the FCC's intervention in interconnection mar-
kets should focus on consumer welfare, and should involve conduct that causes
or is likely to cause harm to the competitive process when examined under the
rule of reason. The focus on consumer harm as the touchstone of regulatory in-
tervention helps the Commission distinguish between disputes that harm com-
petition and those that merely harm a competitor. Partly for this reason, the focus
on consumer harm ripples through the interconnection literature. The Digital
Age Communications Act Proposal, for example, would have conditioned inter-
vention on "practices that pose a substantial and non-transitory risk to consumer
welfare .... "171 Similarly, Professor James Speta would distinguish between
interconnection disputes like the Sprint/Cogent dispute that resulted in loss of
connectivity for consumers, from those such as the Comcast/Level 3 dispute that
simply involved disputes over the terms on which traffic is delivered. 172 More-
over, the Commission should limit itself to conduct creating sustained consumer
harm. This modifier recognizes that, particularly in dynamic markets like the
Internet ecosystem, market evolution can be messy and cause some transient
interruption to consumer service. Such disruptions may be regrettable but should
not alone rise to the level justifying regulatory intervention.
Moreover, when intervening the Commission should assess claims under a
framework similar to the rule of reason analysis that governs antitrust claims.
This would require the Commission to determine the potential harm to compe-
tition resulting from the interconnection dispute, and to consider any offsetting
efficiencies or business justifications arising from the conduct in question. This
approach allows the regulator to develop a complete record to determine whether
a dispute rises to the level of an unfair method of competition, rather than merely
sharp practices within an evolving market.
These modest guideposts fit the regulatory humility that the Commission has
rightly shown when discussing Internet interconnection markets. Given the ro-
bust competition in this space and the speed with which interconnection agree-
ments respond to fluid market conditions, regulatory intervention should be the
exception rather than the rule. For the Internet to grow and develop in response
to changing consumer demand, network providers must be given significant
flexibility to draft appropriate interconnection agreements, even if dynamic new
170 Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding "Unfair Methods of Competition" Un-
der Section 5 of the FTC Act, 80 Fed. Reg. at 57056.
171 MAY ET AL., supra note 109, at 36.
172See Speta, supra note 109, at 128.
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terms differ substantially from existing practices. An antitrust-like standard pre-
serves the space for that evolution to occur while still providing sufficient au-
thority for the Commission to block practices that harm consumers and compe-
tition.
Congress faces some difficulty with assuring that the Commission stays
within this consumer-welfare-oriented antitrust mandate. As Gus Hurwitz has
noted in the Federal Trade Commission context,'7 3 a statutory grant of authority
to regulate "unfair methods of competition" is ambiguous, meaning that courts
are likely to defer under the Chevron doctrine 174 to the agency's interpretation
of its meaning. Hurwitz is correct that this open-ended language is "precisely
the sort of statute to which Chevron deference is meant to apply."'' 75 The phrase
is inherently ambiguous, deliberately granting the agency flexibility to reach
conduct that, in its opinion, poses a threat to competition.'
76
This poses two difficulties. First, such an open-ended regulatory mandate
could allow the agency too much discretion, which can have a chilling effect on
regulated entities, as some have argued with respect to the similarly broad "pub-
lic interest" standard that governs the Commission's regulation of broadcast and
spectrum. 177 Second, it risks conflict with the Federal Trade Commission, which
interprets the same phrase under Section 5. To avoid these potential pitfalls,
Congress should clarify that the Commission has authority to regulate "unfair
methods of competition" within interconnection markets as that term is defined
by the FTC. This caveat would clarify Congress's intent that the statute operate
as an antitrust-based standard focused on consumer welfare and applying the
rule of reason rather than an open-ended grant of regulatory authority, while still
assuring the requisite flexibility to adapt in response to changing market condi-
tions as guided by the FTC, the nation's primary antitrust authority.
C. Assessing the Comcast/Netflix Dispute
To demonstrate how the unfair method of competition standard works in prac-
tice, one could apply it to the 2014 Comcast/Netflix dispute, which is arguably
the most public interconnection dispute to date and therefore the one with the
most information available. Recall that the addition of Netflix traffic to the Co-
113 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1211
(2014); Hurwitz, supra note 161, at 247-249.
174 See generally Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Chevron and its progeny require courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of ambiguities in statutes that the agency administers. Id.
175 Hurwiti, supra note 161, at 248.
176 Id. at 248-249.
177 See, e.g., Lili Levi, The Four Eras of FCC Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 813, 845 ("Critics challenge public interest regulation as such because of the breadth
and vagueness of the concept; the wide discretion it grants the FCC; its fundamentally politi-
cal character; its prior failures; and the constitutional tension it implicates.").
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gent network upset the balance of traffic between the Cogent and Comcast net-
works and exceeded the capacity of the existing connections between the net-
works. 17 8 The companies disputed how to allocate the cost of upgrading these
connections and what transit fees, if any, should be paid for the additional traffic
delivered to the Comcast network. 17 9 Netflix suffered slower speeds until it
agreed to enter a paid peering agreement directly with Comcast. 180
Cogent could complain that Comcast's refusal to upgrade its facilities and
accept the additional traffic under the parties' existing peering agreement con-
stituted an unfair method of competition. Similarly, Netflix could argue that
Comcast's unwillingness to enter a settlement-free peering relationship with its
OpenConnect network constituted unfair competition. Netflix's complaint
would resemble the informal complaint that CNS filed against Time Warner Ca-
ble in 2015, alleging that broadband providers' paid peering demands are anti-
competitive.'
8'
As a threshold matter, the parties are likely to show consumer harm. The dis-
pute caused a reduction in the speed at which Netflix streams were transmitted
to end-user consumers. Because streaming video is congestion-sensitive, this
meant that consumers experienced greater buffering and lower resolution
streams than they would if the dispute had resolved. Admittedly, this degrada-
tion-of-service claim is not as significant as the Cogent/Sprint dispute, during
which consumers lost access to Cogent-hosted edge services altogether. 182 But
the reduced quality was likely perceptible to consumers and therefore would
meet the standard for Commission investigation.
Because the parties can show consumer harm, the Commission would then
use a rule of reason analysis to determine whether Comcast's conduct caused, or
was likely to cause, harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into
account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business justifications. In
this case, both companies could argue that by failing to add capacity unless Co-
gent agreed to a paid peering agreement with regard to the increased traffic flows
from the Cogent network, Comcast was exploiting its unique position in the In-
ternet's ecosystem to extract an anticompetitive advantage. Telecommunica-
tions law has long been concerned with the control that last-mile network pro-
viders maintain over so-called "bottleneck" facilities to consumers, because
ownership of access networks can give rise to concerns about market power.'
83
178 See discussion supra Section I.D.3.
17 9 1d.
180 Id.
181 See Commercial Network Services, Informal Internet Neutrality Complaint (Commer-
cial Network Services v. Time Warner Cable) (June 22, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc-
ument/269402621/Cns-Twc-Fcc-Complaint-Signed [https://perma.cc/BU7A-6WKJ].
18
2 See discussion supra Section I.D.I.
183 See, e.g., United States Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381,431 (Kavanaugh, J, dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing the connection between "bottleneck"
networks and market power in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 US 622, which the
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Although consumers may have a choice between broadband providers, once a
consumer has selected a service provider, that provider controls the only path to
that consumer for the duration of their business relationship together.1 84 This is
sometimes referred to as a "terminating access monopoly" problem.
85
But however valid the terminating access monopoly problem may be in tradi-
tional telephone markets, it is less applicable to Internet interconnection markets.
Although Comcast controls the network leading to its end-user customers, there
are multiple pathways by which Cogent and Netflix can deliver traffic onto that
network. As Christopher Yoo notes, "Comcast maintains 40 settlement-free
peering relationships and over 8,000 paid transit relationships," which provide
Cogent and Netflix with a variety of alternatives to direct interconnection.
86
Even if denied the opportunity to interconnect directly, the companies retain the
fallback of purchasing transit service from a third party to deliver traffic indi-
rectly to Comcast consumers. As long as transit markets remain open, it would
be difficult for Cogent and Netflix to show that Comcast's negotiating position
constituted harm to competition.
It is also worth noting that in this instance, both parties to an interconnection
agreement occupy a strategically important position: while Comcast owns the
final path to the end-user, Netflix controls the initial path from the company's
servers. With 55 million American subscribers 87 who are responsible for up to
one-third of all North American Internet traffic during peak hours, 88 Netflix's
bargaining position is far from ephemeral. When negotiating the terms of their
interconnection agreement, both companies have leverage, because a holdout on
either side could preclude a deal. In fact, as the Commission noted in the Restor-
ing Internet Freedom order, 89 Cogent admitted that it deprioritized certain traf-
fic on its network during the interconnection dispute, exacerbating the effect on
Turner court relied upon to find that must-carry laws did not violate carriers' First Amend-
ment rights).
184 Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Christopher S. Yoo, A Market Oriented Analysis of the
"Terminating Access Monopoly" Concept, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 21,21 (2015).
185 1d.
186 See Christopher S. Yoo, Wickard For the Internet? Network Neutrality After Verizon v.
FCC, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 415,455 (2014).
187 Rani Molla, Netflix Now Has Nearly 118 Million Streaming Subscribers Globally,
RECODE (Jan. 22, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018/l/22/16920150/netflix-q4-
2017-earnings-subscribers [https://perma.cc/4QCS-XJAM].
1
8 8 
SANDVINE, 2016 GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA: LATIN AMERICA AND NORTH AMERICA
4 (2016), https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/archive/2016-global-internet-phe-
nomena-report-latin-america-and-north-america.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2L8-ATHY] (noting
that Netflix is responsible for 10.33% of upload, 35.15% of download, and 32.72% of aggre-
gate traffic during peak-time on fixed networks in North America).
189 Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 3, at 171.
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Netflix users. 190 One could also argue that Netflix deliberately routed excessive
data to under-provisioned Cogent connections and then publicly advertised the
deleterious effect this had on delivery to Comcast customers. If true, these prac-
tices could constitute unfair methods of competition by Cogent and Netflix.
Ultimately, Comcast would likely argue that the increase in Netflix-related
traffic warranted a new, paid peering agreement, both to fund upgrades to the
connections between networks and to compensate for the new traffic imbalance.
While Netflix argued that settlement-free peering is better than paid peering,
economically, there is no reason to prefer one type of payment over another. As
Kevin Werbach has noted, Internet transport is a classic two-sided market: Com-
cast generates revenue from providing its customers connectivity to Internet con-
tent, while Cogent'profits from connecting Netflix to end-users (who, in turn pay
Netflix for its video content). 191 The advent of streaming video providers like
Netflix dramatically increased traffic volumes flowing to Comcast and other
broadband networks, which increases costs. A paid peering relationship shifts
those costs onto Cogent and Netflix, which can ultimately recover them from
Netflix subscribers. On the other hand, a settlement-free peering relationship
would shift those costs to Comcast, which would spread them across its cus-
tomer base through broadband fees. From a policy perspective, a paid peering
arrangement would force Netflix to internalize its costs and keep overall broad-
band rates lower, while settlement-free peering would subsidize innovative new
edge services by spreading those costs across all broadband users.
1 92
Although the exact terms of the agreement remain confidential, and therefore
it is impossible to determine for certain how a complaint would have been re-
solved, it is unlikely that the Commission would find that seeking a paid peering
relationship, alone, constitutes an unfair method of competition. Netflix's deci-
sion to interconnect directly with Comcast and other broadband providers re-
flects one way that the competitive interconnection marketplace can adapt to
meet the challenges presented by innovative new services. Although we cannot
determine the overall effect of paid peering on Netflix, agreements that eliminate
a middleman are typically efficient and welfare-enhancing. Netflix is now pay-
ing a fee to Comcast, but it is no longer paying Cogent to deliver that traffic to
'90Dan Rayburn, Cogent Now Admits They Slowed Down Netflix's Traffic, Creating A Fast
Lane & Slow Lane, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Nov. 5,2014, 12:55 PM), https://www.stream-
ingmediablog.com/2014/1 1/cogent-now-admits-slowed-netflixs-traffic-creating-fast-lane-
slow-lane.html [https://perma.cc/G7C7-Y7XP].
9' Werbach, supra note 77, at 1783.
192 Id. As the Supreme Court recently noted, two-sided platforms differ from traditional
markets in important ways, most notably by exhibiting indirect network effects. See Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280-81 (2018). Therefore when determining the propriety
of practices setting price on one side, it is important to consider the potential effect on prices
on the other side of the platform as well. Id.
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the Comcast network. 93 The fact that Netflix chose direct interconnection rather
than continuing to rely on Cogent or pursuing an agreement with another third-
part service suggests that it found this to be the best alternative, either because
the price was better or the quality of the service is worth any price premium.
194
Unsurprisingly, since the agreement was signed, Comcast customers have seen
improved performance from Netflix, because the data travels a more direct route
to the customer's house and is no longer dependent upon potentially overloaded
interconnection bottlenecks. 95 And other content providers who rely upon Co-
gent and other CDNs will likely see an improvement as well, as Netflix traffic
no longer places such a significant burden on transit network links.
Far from signaling a problem, Netflix's direct interconnection agreements
demonstrate the robustness of the interconnection market. When the company's
quality suffered as the result of an interconnection dispute, it selected a more
efficient agreement from among myriad options to mitigate its exposure. Like
multi-homing, secondary peering, and CDNs, this direct interconnection agree-
ment shows how a fluid interconnection market can adapt in response to changes
in external stimuli. As Professor Yoo explains, these innovations stem from net-
work providers' experiments with new ways to reduce costs and improve the
quality of transmission of Internet content. 96 Of course, specific behavior in
specific interconnection negotiations can rise to the level of unfair methods of
competition. But consistent with a rule of reason analysis, the Commission
'93 Moreover, Netflix is not the first company to enter into a direct, paid peering agreement.
As noted above, several prominent Internet content providers have built server farms to by-
pass parts of the public Internet, relying at least in part on direct interconnection with broad-
band providers to do so. In fact, Comcast has an entire business unit dedicated to selling in-
terconnection services. See Lance Ulanoff, The Comcast-Netflix Deal: Fact vs. Fiction,
[https://perma.cc/MY66-W9LR]. Amazon, Google, and Facebook are among the content pro-
viders who have "eliminated the middleman" and signed direct interconnection agreements
with Comcast. See Jon Brodkin, See Which ISPs Google, Microsoft, and Netflix Trade Inter-
net Traffic With, ARs TECHNICA, (May 21, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/infor-
mation-technology/2014/05/see-which-isps-google-microsoft-and-netflix-trade-intemet-traf-
fic-with/ [https://perma.cc/KD9S-9S79].
194 Notably, many interconnection agreements contain a Service Level Agreement whereby
the network guarantees a minimum level of quality. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 184, at 454
("The Comcast-Netflix interconnection agreement appears to be nothing more than a typical
case of such bargaining. One advantage is that because it now is a direct customer of Comcast,
it gains the benefit of the guaranteed service levels in Comcast's standard service-level agree-
ment."). Streaming media providers like Netflix, whose services are latency-dependent, may
find SLAs more valuable than intermediate transit providers. See id. ("Indeed, media reports
indicate that Comcast customers are experiencing a quality enhancement in their Netflix ex-
perience.").
195 Sam Gustin, This is Why Netflix Just Got So Blazingly Fast, TIME (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://time.com/62903/netflix-comcast-speed-boost/ [https://perma.cc/828Y-DCRK].
196 Yoo, supra note 7, at 69.
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should be reluctant to label paid peering generally as an unfair method of com-
petition, for fear of ossifying the current environment and disrupt this virtuous
cycle of innovation.
D. Remedy
Assuming that the Commission finds that a particular practice constitutes un-
fair competition, the final question is what the remedy should be. One's first
response may be to allow the Commission to order interconnection to remedy
the problematic conduct. And perhaps the agency should have this power as a
last resort, as a way to encourage the parties to negotiate. But given the com-
plexity and dynamism of interconnection markets, the Commission should focus
primarily upon facilitating further negotiation between the parties to arrive at a
negotiated solution. 197 Interconnection agreements can involve several different
practices, and can themselves represent only one facet of the full relationship
between the two parties. Once a problem is laid bare, the parties have a wide
range of tools with which to find consensus, especially when prompted by an
effective dispute resolution specialist. This means that a privately negotiated so-
lution is likely to be more efficient than one imposed by the regulator from a
more limited set of options.
The Commission's prior experience with cable retransmission disputes pro-
vides one model of successful facilitating of privately ordered solutions to inter-
connection-like debates. Under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, cable companies were prohibited from retransmitting
a broadcaster's over-the-air signal to cable subscribers without the broadcaster's
consent. 198 The purpose of this provision, known as "retransmission consent,"
was to protect free over-the-air broadcast from cable competition. As the FCC
has explained, broadcast programming was historically the most popular content
on cable systems, meaning that a "substantial portion of the benefits for which
consumers pay cable systems is derived from carriage" of broadcast systems.1
99
Through the retransmission consent regime, Congress sought to provide a mech-
anism by which broadcasters could negotiate to receive compensation for the
value of their signals, and thereby share in the profits to be gained by the pay
television revolution.2
°
197 Cf. Werbach, supra note 110, at 1299 ("An effective set of interconnection rules would
be designed to maximize the likelihood of voluntary private agreement.").
198 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 6, 47 U.S.C. §
325(b) (2012).
199 Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 26 FCC
Rcd. 2718, T 4 (2011) [hereinafter "Retransmission Rules Amendment"].
200 While the retransmission consent regime offers a useful model, it is important to recog-
nize the differences between retransmission consent and interconnection markets. As noted
above, Internet content providers have multiple alternatives to reach broadband customers via
transit markets in the event of an interconnection impasse. See supra note 186, at 454-55 and
accompanying text. Broadcasters have a similar ability to reach consumers directly over-the-
2018]
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
As the FCC noted, Congress intended the agency's role in retransmission con-
sent negotiations to be limited.2 °0 Congress considered and rejected a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme that would have required the Commission "to pro-
hibit broadcasters from engaging in discriminatory practices, understandings,
arrangements, and activities, including exclusive contracts for carriage, that pre-
vent a multichannel video programming distributor from obtaining retransmis-
sion consent from such stations. ' 20 2 Instead, since 1999 the Commission has
been given the more modest task of enforcing the statutory mandate that broad-
casters negotiate "in good faith" with cable and satellite operators. 203
Drawing upon the analogous "good faith" negotiating standard of Section 8(d)
of the Taft-Hartley Act,20 4 the agency developed a two-part test for good faith
negotiation. 20 5 The first is a list of negotiation standards that broadcasters must
meet:
(1) a broadcaster cannot refuse to negotiate with a MVPD operator;
(2) it must appoint a negotiating representative with authority to sign a re-
transmission consent agreement;
(3) it must meet at reasonable times and places and cannot unduly delay
the negotiations;
(4) it cannot put forth a single, unilateral proposal;
(5) in responding to a cable operator's offer, it must give considered rea-
sons for rejecting proposed terms;
(6) it cannot enter into an agreement conditioned upon denying retransmis-
sion consent to another operator;20 6 and
(7) the top four broadcast stations in a market cannot jointly negotiate with
the cable operator for broadcast rights.
207
Secondly, "even if these specific standards are met, the Commission may con-
sider whether, based on the totality o the circumstances, a party tailed to nego-
tiate retransmission consent in good faith." 20 8 "The Commission has stated that,
air in the event of a retransmission consent blackout, but this is more burdensome for con-
sumers, as it requires them to maintain an over-the-air antenna and to switch away from a
cable box, which limits the value of this fallback bargaining position.
201 Retransmission Rules Amendment, 26 FCC Rcd.at 2766.
202 H.R. 1554, 106th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1999) (unenacted Section 325(b)(2)(C)(ii)).
203 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C) (2014); see Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Im-
provement Act of 1999, 15 FCC Rcd. 5445,5T 1-2 (2000).
20 4 Id. TJ 19-22.
205 Id. $f'f 28-32.
20647 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(1) (2015).
207 See Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 29 FCC
Rcd. 3351,1 1 (2014).
208 Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 2718, T 10 (2011).
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where 'a broadcaster is determined to have failed to negotiate in good faith, the
Commission will instruct the parties to renegotiate the agreement in accordance
with the Commission's rules and Section 325(b)(3)(C)."
'' 20 9
Since the Commission promulgated rules to enforce the good faith standard,
it has seen very few complaints brought by providers regarding retransmission
consent disputes. In 2001, the agency rejected a complaint by EchoStar alleging
that Young Broadcasting failed to negotiate in good faith. 210 Similarly, the cable
bureau rejected a complaint in 2009 brought against Gray Television Licen-
see.211 An earlier 2007 complaint, against Sinclair Broadcasting, settled follow-
ing an agreed-upon extension by the parties before the Commission had to
rule.212 In fact, only once has the Commission found a party failed to negotiate
in good faith: in 2007, finding against a cable operator.213 In that instance, the
agency ordered the parties to resume negotiations and provide status updates
every thirty days.
214
It is important to consider what remedies the Commission might seek in the
event a counterparty fails to negotiate in good faith. While the Commission did
not find any statutory authority to impose damages, it noted that, as with all
violations of the Communications Act or the Commission's rules, it has the au-
thority to impose forfeitures for violations of Section 325(b)(3)(C). 2 15 When dis-
cussing remedies for a violation of the good faith negotiation requirement, the
Commission did not reference continued carriage as a potential remedy, and
stated that it could not adopt regulations permitting retransmission during good
faith negotiation or while a good faith complaint is pending before the Commis-
sion, absent broadcaster consent to such retransmission."
216
The Commission may rightfully claim that its retransmission consent rules are
relatively successful, given the paucity of filed complaints and the identification
of only one failure to meet the statutory standard in a fifteen-year period. But
this does not mean the public has been free of retransmission consent disputes.
209 Id. (quoting Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999,
15 FCC Rcd. 5445,5 81 (2000)).
2' 0 EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. Young Broad., Inc., 16 FCC Rcd. 15070 (2001).
211 See ATC Broadband LLC and Dixie Cable TV, Inc. v. Gray Television Licensee, Inc.,
24 FCC Rcd. 1645 (2009).
212 See Mediacom Commc'ns Corp. v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 11093,
11093 (2007). Although Mediacom filed an application for review of the Media Bureau's
order, Mediacom and Sinclair subsequently announced the completion of a retransmission
consent agreement, and the Media Bureau thus granted Mediacom's motion to dismiss the
case with prejudice. Id.
213 See Letter to Jorge L. Bauermeister, 22 FCC Rcd. 4933 (2007).
2141d.
215 Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, supra note
208,5 10.
2 16 Id. (quoting Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999,
supra note 208, 81).
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As cable revenues have stagnated and broadcasters have grown increasingly re-
liant on retransmission consent revenue to deliver top-line growth to sharehold-
ers, renewal agreements have grown increasingly contentious and the American
public has been increasingly aware of the effects. As a result of a 2010 retrans-
mission consent dispute between Cablevision and Walt Disney Corporation,
New York viewers lost the ABC network for twenty-one hours, including the
first fourteen minutes of the Academy Awards. 21 7 Later that year, Cablevision
viewers lost Fox stations for fifteen days, resulting in a blackout of the Major
League Baseball's National League Championship Series and the first two
games of the World Series.2 18 More recently, CBS Corporation leveraged its
widespread holdings during a retransmission consent dispute with Time Warner
Cable to black out not only the CBS owned-and-operator stations in several ma-
jor markets, but also several cable channels including Showtime, and blocked
visitors to the CBS.com website from Time Warner Cable IP addresses. 219 In
response, Time Warner Cable offered to install rooftop antennas for affected
customers to draw in the CBS signal for free.
220
These disputes raise the question what the optimal blackout rate should be.
Congress was aware that some blackouts would occur in retransmission consent
disputes.22' Given that the purpose of retransmission consent was to force cable
operators to "compensate the broadcaster for the value its product creates for the
cable operator," 222 one could argue that the power to blackout a signal is a fea-
ture, not a bug, of the regime. Blackouts create inconvenience for consumers,
who are likely to direct their ire not toward the broadcaster but the cable opera-
tor, whom they pay to receive a channel that is not being delivered. This con-
sumer dissatisfaction gives the broadcaster additional leverage by putting pres-
sure on the cable operator to resolve the dispute quickly. And ultimately, a non-
zero blackout rate does not appear to have measurably affected consumer wel-
fare: as noted above, most blackouts last a few hours or, at most, a few days,
2 17 
Id. T 15.
2181id.
2 19 Hillary Lewis & Alex Ben Block, Time Warner Cable Loses 306,000 TV Subscribers
Amid CBS Dispute, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 31, 2013, 6:17 AM), https://www.hol-
lywoodreporter.com/news/time-warner-cable-loses-306000-652131 [https://perma.cc/3VEP-
95XP].
220/Id.
221 See 38 Cong. Rec. S639-40 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Seymour) ("For
example, what happens if a cable operator refuses to pay a broadcaster even 1 cent for his
signal? Is every cable subscriber in the entire community going to be denied access to the
affiliate's signal? Some have answered that a cable consumer can simply disconnect his or
her cable unit, or install an 'A/B' switch, and pick up the over-the-air signal. That sounds
simple. Again, it is even logical. However, it is not that simple. Many consumers who live in
rural, or mountainous areas with poor over-the-air reception do not have the ability to receive
network programming beyond the cable wire .... others may not have the know-how to
switch from antenna to cable and back again.").
222 121. S. Rep. No. 102-92 (1991), at 35, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168.
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with only one case where the Commission needed to get involved to resolve the
dispute .223
The Commission can draw from this model to remedy interconnection dis-
putes. The finding that an interconnection dispute stems from an unfair method
of competition could trigger a good faith duty to negotiate by the offending
party. This would require the offending party to enter negotiations without un-
due delay, to refrain from making a single take-it-or-leave-it offer, and to pro-
vide a written rationale for refusing to accept the counterparty's offer. In the
event of a complete breakdown, the Commission could order mandatory base-
ball-style arbitration where each side gives its best and final offer and the arbi-
trator chooses one offer, which binds both parties.
224
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE OF INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS
Thus far, this Article has focused on the narrow question of identifying and
remedying problematic interconnection disputes. But the Comcast/Netflix dis-
pute highlighted a broader difficulty, namely that the Commission and the public
has limited visibility into interconnection markets. To fulfill its obligations as a
sector-specific regulator, the agency must take regular steps to inform itself (and
the public) about the state of the market. But it should reject calls by some ad-
vocates to mandate interconnection agreements be made public, 225 as this could
chill the efficient negotiation of interconnection agreements and risks facilitating
collusion among providers.
A. Transparency and Market Analysis
The Commission should begin by attempting to gather more information to
understand how interconnection markets work. When faced with Netflix's com-
plaints in early 2014 that paid peering posed a threat to the Open Internet, the
Commission appropriately responded by asking for copies of the interconnection
agreements in question, to develop a better understanding of how these markets
work.226 The Open Internet order suggested that the learning curve is steep, and
the agency had not yet satisfied itself that it understood the complex dynamics
at work in this market. 227 Before undertaking a comprehensive law of intercon-
nection, the Commission should gather additional facts to understand better the
223 See supra text accompanying note 213.
224 See RANDOLPH J. MAY ET AL., FREE STATE FOUNDATION, RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN THE
FOURTH WHITE PAPER "NETWORK INTERCONNECTION" 11 (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.free-
statefoundation.org/images/Response-to-Questions in-the FourthWhitePa-
per_080814.pdf [https://perma.cc/C67E-4L3D]; Werbach, supra note 110, at 1299.
225 See supra note 95.
226 See Jon Brodkin, FCC Gets Comcast, Verizon to Reveal Netflix's Paid Peering Deals,
ARS TECHNICA, (Jun. 13, 2014, 1:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/fcc-
gets-comcast-verizon-to-reveal-netflixs-paid-peering-deals/ [https://perma.cc/GW7K-
QXNS].
227 Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 3, at 202.
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dynamic nature of this market and where the potential for anticompetitive abuse
may lie.
Section 706(b) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act provides the Commis-
sion a potential jurisdictional hook. Under this provision the Commission must
regularly inquire into "the availability of advanced telecommunications capabil-
ity to all Americans" and to determine "whether advanced telecommunications
capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fash-
ion."228 Under this authority, the Commission currently conducts an annual in-
quiry into the state of broadband competition. 229 By extending the definition of
"advanced telecommunications capability" under this statute to encompass in-
terconnection markets as well, the Commission can fold a study of interconnec-
tion into its existing 706(b) reporting framework, which would allow it both to
inform itself each year about the nature of interconnection markets and to report
its findings, on an aggregated basis, to the public.
B. Disclosure of Interconnection Agreements
But the Commission should be reluctant to adopt rules that require public dis-
closure of private interconnection agreements between networks. At first glance,
this proposal (offered by numerous advocates in the wake of the Comcast/Net-
flix controversy) appears to improve transparency in a market that the Commis-
sion has not yet investigated at length. But it may have the unintended conse-
quence of harming competition among peering and transit providers by reducing
barriers to collusion by larger networks. Even absent collusion, disclosure is
likely to adversely affect prices by reducing companies' incentives to discount.
Numerous well-documented examples illustrate the negative effect that disclo-
sure regimes can have on prices and competition.
1. Disclosure of Private Interconnection Agreements Can Facilitate
Tacit Collusion
a. Antitrust Law Recognizes the Risks of Price
Transparency
At first glance, the benefits of a price disclosure regime can seem enticing.
The model of perfect competition assumes that buyers have perfect information
as to firm prices and predicts that markets will move toward uniform, competi-
tive prices for comparable goods.230 Increased access to firm pricing can reduce
search costs for consumers hunting for the best deal. 231 It also may reduce a
228 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706(b), 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012).
2 29 Id.; Broadband Progress Reports, FED. COMMC'N. COMM'N, https://www.fcc.gov/re-
ports-research/reports/broadband-progress -reports [https://perma.cc/4BHV-WPEP] (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2018).
230 See Maurice E. Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency, 19
ANTITRUST 81,81 (2005).
231 id.
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seller's ability to price discriminate,23 2 although one might note that price dis-
crimination itself has ambiguous effects on competition.
233
But increased price transparency can also have anticompetitive effects by fa-
cilitating the negotiation and enforcement of supracompetitive prices.23 4 It is a
"basic tenet in the economics and industrial organization literature" that "sharing
information about cost, transaction prices, and other competitively sensitive in-
formation among rivals makes tacit collusion more likely."235 For almost one
hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
"the exchange of price information among competitors carries with it the added
potential for the development of concerted price-fixing arrangements which lie
at the core of the Sherman Act's prohibitions." 23 6 "Regardless of its putative
purpose," said the Court, "the most likely consequence of any such agreement
to exchange price information would be the stabilization of industry prices."
237
Federal antitrust authorities have also long warned about the potential anti-
competitive risks of transparency among competitors. "A market typically is
more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if each competitively important firm's
significant competitive initiatives can be promptly and confidently observed by
that firm's rivals. This is more likely to be the case if the terms offered to cus-
tomers are relatively transparent. '238 While the sharing of information among
competitors can be procompetitive, "in some cases, the sharing of information
related to a market in which the collaboration operates or in which the partici-
pants are actual or potential competitors may increase the likelihood of collusion
on matters such as price."
239
The FTC/DOJ Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors
offers three red flags to help identify when information disclosure may facilitate
collusion.
0 Information about price: "Other things being equal, the sharing
of information relating to price, output, costs, or strategic planning
232 Id.
233 See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 5 2340c (3d ed. 2012).
234 Stucke, supra note 230.
235 Joanna Shepherd, Is More Information Always Better? Mandatory Disclosure Regula-
tions in the Prescription Drug Market, 99 CORNELL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 19-20 (2013); see also
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 45-46 (1964).
236 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,457 (1978); see also Maple Flooring
Mfg. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Am.
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
237 U.S. Gypsum Co., 257 U.S. at 457.
238 
FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 7.2
(2010).
23 9
FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.31 (b) (2000).
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is more likely to raise competitive concern than the sharing of in-
formation relating to less competitively sensitive variables."
240
* Current information: "Similarly, other things being equal, the
sharing of information on current operating and future business
plans is more likely to raise concerns than the sharing of historical
information.
'
"241
* Individual Company Data: "Finally, other things being equal,
the sharing of individual company data is more likely to raise con-
cern than the sharing of aggregated data that does not permit re-
cipients to identify individual firm data."
242
Of course, the proposal to mandate disclosure of individual interconnection
agreements raises all three red flags: it would reveal real-time information about
prices and costs of transit on a company-by-company basis.
b. The Mechanics of Tacit Collusion
Price transparency helps overcome the two. primary barriers to collusion.
First, the open communication of prices reduces the uncertainty of negotiating a
supracompetitive price.2 43 Because overt communication about price collusion
is prohibited by the Sherman Act, firms seeking to collude must overcome the
difficulty of communicating indirectly to establish their target price. But as the
Container Corp. Court explained, sharing current price data can solve this prob-
lem by signaling a target toward which others can move. In that case, suppliers
of corrugated containers shared current price information upon request about the
most recent price charged for a good.24 4 The Court explained that "[t]he ex-
change of price information seemed to have the effect of keeping prices within
a fairly narrow ambit[,]" because "[k]nowledge of a competitor's price usually
meant matching that price." 245 The result was a movement toward a stable, uni-
0JI 1.;C lk VJ6lodUl 0 Lil S3i ,nai A, t. '
Once firms have established a collusive price, transparency also helps enforce
the collusive agreement.2 47 Here, as the Supreme Court has said, "[u]ncertainty
is an oligopoly's greatest enemy," 248 because of the difficulty of identifying and
punishing cheaters. But price transparency eliminates that uncertainty and there-
fore facilitates enforcement:
240 id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See Stucke, supra note 230 at 81.
244 United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1969).
245 d. at 336-37.
246 Id. at 334.
247 Stucke, supra note 230.
248 Brook Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 238 (1993).
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If... every transaction is publicized immediately, all members of the in-
dustry will know when one has made a price cut, and each can retaliate on
the next transaction. Knowledge that retaliation will be swift serves as a
powerful deterrent to price cutting and therefore facilitates the maintenance
of tacitly collusive prices.
249
Because market players know that any attempt at cheating will bring a swift
response, they are less inclined to defect from the collusive price in the first
place.
The general risk of tacit collusion is magnified by several structural factors
inherent in the interconnection market. The first is concentration of competi-
tively important players. Collusion is easier when fewer firms need to cooper-
ate.250 Though there are roughly 35,000 networks in the interconnection mar-
ket,251 disclosure proponents argue that only a handful of them need to cooperate
to control interconnection rates to end-user broadband networks. If they are cor-
rect, transparency would ease efforts by those broadband network providers to
collude on a market price for interconnecting to last-mile networks. Second,
there are significant barriers to entry. 252 Building and operating a broadband net-
work requires significant upfront capital, which helps insulate the collusive
scheme from the threat of competitive entry. Third, providers enter into regular
and frequent interconnection agreements, most of which govern only a small
portion of total traffic carried over a network. This makes cheating less likely
because there is little benefit from departing from the collusive price in a single
transaction, and competitors can move quickly to punish any defector.253 Finally,
players in the interconnection market are customers as well as competitors; these
multimarket contacts provide multiple pressure points with which to punish a
cheater, which makes cheating less likely.
254
Though interconnection markets differ somewhat from a typical wholesale
transaction, the principles play out similarly. A broadband provider could at-
tempt to communicate a collusive industry-wide interconnection rate to its rivals
by insisting on that rate in a negotiation with a single content provider, and pub-
licly disclosing the resulting agreement. Its likelihood of success would increase
if the broadband provider is sufficiently large to command leverage in the nego-
tiation, particularly if the negotiation is with a relatively small content provider.
249
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 348 (3d ed. 1990).
250 See, e.g., John M. Kuhlman, Nature and the Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 69, 71 (1969) (noting that "[e]nforcement obviously becomes
more difficult as more and more firms are added to the agreement").
251 See YOO, supra note 7.
252 Kuhlman, supra note 250, at 72.
253 See James E. Hartley, Market Definition in a Monopoly Case, C695 ALI-ABA 99, 143
(1991).
254 See generally Amalia R. Miller, Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collu-
sion?, 53 J.L. & ECON. 569 (2010).
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Once the interconnection price is publicized, rival broadband providers can use
that price as an anchor or target to guide their own negotiations with content
providers. As other interconnection agreements are made public, the would-be
colluders could monitor the success of their efforts in real-time and adjust their
proposed price targets if necessary through successive interconnection agree-
ments in an attempt to achieve their shared objective. The multitude of potential
content providers with which to partner allows the process to be highly iterative
and eases the ability to use individual transactions to determine initial success
and monitor ongoing compliance. Enforcement of the collusive price can be
done in myriad ways, including by changing the terms of peering agreements
between broadband networks to ensure cooperation with the collusive market
for interconnection with upstream content.
Moreover, the complexity of interconnection agreements can mask tacit col-
lusion. Interconnection agreements can run hundreds of pages and contain thou-
sands of terms. It is unclear to what extent disclosure will increase transparency
of the market to members of the public who lack detailed familiarity with such
deals. But this complexity can mask attempts by firms to communicate with one
another in violation of the Sherman Act, through fine print and price quotes that
lay deep within the text of these lengthy, complex agreements. Similar allega-
tions lay at the core of the Airline Tariff Publishing case. The Federal Trade
Commission alleged that certain airlines used an automated fare reporting sys-
tem to coordinate fare increases by communicating via footnotes, start dates, and
end dates that were publicly disclosed but were of little relevance to consumers
or travel agents.
255
2. Even Absent Collusion, Disclosure Can Negatively Impact Prices
Disclosure can also lead to rising prices without collusive action that would
violate antitrust law. Even absent tacit collusion, transparency can have an an-
ticompetitive effect based simply on the unilateral rational actions of market
players. As the Court noted in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., firms may set prices at "a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive
level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence
with respect to price and output decisions. 256 Particularly in concentrated mar-
kets, it is unsurprising to find that firms may set their prices based partly on
strategic considerations about their competitors' behavior. 5 7 Absent some
agreement among competitors, supracompetitive pricing that emerges from the
unilateral actions of multiple market players does not violate the Sherman Act-
though it has an adverse effect on customers and competition.
25 8
255 United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1993).
256 Brook Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
257 Stucke, supra note 230.
2 58 id.
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Price transparency undermines the likelihood that a particular firm will dis-
count to gain a competitive advantage. As the Federal Trade Commission has
explained, coordinated information sharing "can blunt a firm's incentive to offer
customers better deals by undercutting the extent to which such a move would
win business away from rivals."259 Market participants typically offer discounts
in an attempt to gain market share away from rivals. But a company is less likely
to offer such a discount if competitors can quickly learn the details of the agree-
ment and move to match. 260 Because it would be unlikely that discounting would
gain share, firms would be less likely to do so.
Transparency also decreases the incentives for companies to price goods ag-
gressively. When a firm lacks knowledge about its competitor's prices, it has
incentives to offer low prices in an attempt to beat the "unknown" deal. 26 1 But
when rival pricing is no longer unknown, "the incentive to outbid unknown price
terms disappears ."262
In broadband markets, the planes of competition among broadband providers
includes both interconnection price and quality of service. One could argue that
because consumption of Internet content is somewhat non-rivalrous, broadband
providers lack some of the incentives to price aggressively in response to their
rivals like typical wholesalers do. If AT&T offers a low interconnection rate to
Netflix, for example, it is unlikely that Netflix will shift some of its volume away
from Verizon as a result. But transparency could affect Netflix's likelihood of
securing non-price features that affect the quality of the product as delivered to
end-user consumers, such as the capacity and location of interconnection ports.
AT&T could bid aggressively by taking technical measures to assure that Netflix
traffic is delivered with fewer interruptions over its network, which allows it to
tout superior network quality to both content providers and end-user consumers.
But those incentives would be retarded if public disclosure allowed rivals to
move quickly to counter, because AT&T would secure no demonstrable long-
term advantage as a result of these efforts.
Notably, disclosure of interconnection agreements may also have anticompet-
itive effects on adjacent markets for content and applications. First, disclosure
may make it easier for networks to price discriminate against particular content,
because they could more easily identify the transit networks that targeted content
providers use to deliver their traffic to the Internet, and can press for higher
transit fees from those networks. Second, the disclosure of interconnection
agreements will allow content and application providers access to competitively
259 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 7.2, supra note 238.
260 See Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Mark Formby, Rep., Miss. H.R., at 6 (Mar. 22,
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110322mississippipbm.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NHD-
9LGA] (discussing anticompetitive effects of proposed state law mandating disclosure of
price terms in pharmaceutical industry).
261 Shepherd, supra note 235, at 19.
262 Id. at 20.
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sensitive data about their rivals' transit costs, which can raise risks of tacit col-
lusion in content and application markets. Third, content and application provid-
ers who are concerned about protecting this information may contract with net-
works that are not subject to disclosure rules, such as CDNs, or they may attempt
to self-provision transit service to avoid disclosing cost information to competi-
tors, even in situations where it would otherwise be uneconomical to do so.
3. Case Studies
Several empirical studies have established that mandatory disclosure of com-
petitively sensitive information can be associated with higher prices.
a. Railroad Grain Contracting
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 deregulated much of the railroad industry and
allowed railroads to enter into privately-negotiated contracts with shippers and
receivers.2 63 Concerned that the railroads were price discriminating against
small shippers, in 1986 Congress mandated the railroads disclose publicly the
"essential terms" of any agricultural contracts. 264 These terms included price, the
identity of the customer, the origin and destination of the shipment, the length
of the contract, volume requirements, prior contracts between the parties, and
effective date.
265
An empirical study showed that this disclosure obligation had a significant
and adverse effect on the price for railroad shipping.266 Prior to the 1986 disclo-
sure obligation, rates for railroad transportation of wheat in the Plains states was
declining, a finding consistent with other studies testing the effect of deregula-
tion on railroad rates.267 But this trend reversed sharply after the disclosure ob-
ligations took effect in January 1987. After controlling for exogenous forces, the
study found that rates rose between 10 and 13.7 percent. 268 The authors con-
chided that "contract disclosure and the increased reliance on nosted tariffs fa-
cilitated rate coordination by the oligopolistic railroad industry, thereby leading
to an increase in rail rates." 269 They note that this finding is consistent with ear-
lier findings about rate disclosure in the inland barge industry.
270
263 See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
264 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 § 4051, 100 Stat.
1874, 1910.
265 Id.
266 See Stephen W. Fuller et al., Effect of Contract Disclosure on Price: Railroad Grain
Contracting in the Plains, 15 WEST. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 265,265-66 (1990).
267 Id. at 270.
268
id.
269 Id. at 271.
270 Id. (citing J.T. Hong and C.R. Plott, Rate Fixing Policies for Inland Water Transporta-
tion: An Experimental Approach, 13 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1982)).
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b. Ready-Mixed Concrete
In 1993, the Competition Council, Denmark's antitrust authority, gathered
and published statistics on the transaction prices of individual firms for two
grades of ready-mixed concrete in three regions within Denmark. 27 1 The Council
took this action under authority granted to it by the Competition Act of 1990,
which instructed the Council to combat suspected oligopoly collusion through
measures designed to increase market transparency. 272 From October 1993 until
December 1996, the Council sampled actual invoice prices from eighteen pro-
duction sites in three regions, and published this firm-specific price data quar-
terly in the hope of improving information for buyers (primarily building con-
tractors).273
As in the railroad example, the unintended consequence of this disclosure re-
gime was to facilitate collusion and raise prices.274 According to one study, av-
erage prices of reported grades rose between fifteen and twenty percent in the
first year following publication. 275 Prices also converged significantly across
firms serving the same market. 276 The authors considered, but rejected, several
alternative explanations for this dramatic increase, including business upturn,
capacity constraints, and input prices. 277 Ultimately, the authors conclude, "the
evidence presented in this paper indicates that the Danish Competition Council,
by providing reliable price reporting services, has unwittingly assisted firms in
reducing the intensity of competition and thereby allowed them to increase
prices."278
c. Telecommunications
The Federal Communications Commission has also previously considered
acknowledged that "[o]ne of the basic prerequisites for [] anticompetitive be-
havior is knowledge of a competitor's prices." 279 Beginning in 1983, the Com-
mission discussed whether tariffing of nondominant telephone companies "im-
pair[ed] competitive pricing, and facilitate[d] collusive conduct. '280 It noted that
"[florbearance involves less disclosure to competitors of carriers' rates and tariff
271 See Svend Albaek et al., Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete
Case, 45 J. INDUS. EcON. 429,429 (1997).
272 Id. at 429-30.
273 Id. at 432.
274 Fuller, supra note 266, at 271.
275 Svend Albaek et al., supra note 27 1, at 429.
27 6 Id. at 430.
27 7 Id. at 429,440.
27 81 d. at 441.
279 See Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, J 143
(1990).
..0 See Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and
Facils. Authorizations Therefor, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554,583 n.l (1983).
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conditions than streamlined regulation" and consequently would "eliminate[] a
potential vehicle for collusive conduct and facilitate[] price discounting."
281
The Commission expanded on these thoughts in 1985, explaining that:
The continuation of tariffs for forborne carriers [] presents an
opportunity for collusive pricing by competing carriers. Since
carriers can ascertain their competitors' existing rates and keep
track of any changes in those rates by reviewing the filed tar-
iffs, carriers may be encouraged to maintain rates at an artifi-
cially high level. Without forborne carrier tariffs on file, carri-
ers may initiate price cutting or generally institute rates at a
lower level to meet directly customer demand.
282
Although it ultimately concluded that the evidence was "inconclusive as to
the issue of tacit price coordination among AT&T, MCI and Sprint," it con-
cluded that to the extent that such coordination existed, it was "better addressed
by removing regulatory requirements that may facilitate such conduct.
283
4. The Possibility of Tacit Collusion Could Invite Costly Antitrust
Scrutiny
Even if the disclosure regime ultimately has no actual anticompetitive effects,
the proposed rule would impose substantial compliance obligations on the in-
dustry. Network providers must scrutinize interconnection agreements to assure
that there are no antitrust concerns with disclosure, and that the agreements do
not otherwise contain proprietary or competitively sensitive information. The
disclosure obligation may also limit parties' flexibility when negotiating an in-
terconnection agreement, because of concerns that any terms in the final agree-
ment would be made public.
284
Moreover, assuming the burden of these compliance costs provides no guar-
antee that the firm will avoid a costly antitrust investigation. As noted above,
281 Id. at 583 n.3.
282 See Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and
Facils. Authorizations Therefor, Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 13 (1985).
283 See Motion of AT&T to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 11 FCC Rcd. 3271,
82-83 (1995); see, e.g., Peter K. Pitsch & Arthur W. Bresnahan, Common Carrier Regula-
tion of Telecommunications Contracts and the Private Carrier Alternative, 48 FED. COMM.
L.J. 447, 484 (1996) (proposing private contracts as alternative to public tariff, to avoid po-
tential price coordination).
2 84 See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473,482-484 (2007) (explaining that "forced disclosure
deters the creation or collection of information that is valuable when kept secret, but that loses
its value when disclosed").
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federal antitrust officials look skeptically at arrangements to share prices, par-
ticularly given the structural factors that mark interconnection markets. 85 The
routine exchange of such competitively sensitive information is likely to attract
regular antitrust oversight and could trigger investigations of firms that are in
fact innocent of wrongdoing. The fact that the Commission has mandated dis-
closure is not a complete defense if antitrust authorities suspect that parties are
misusing the disclosure regime to illegally collude. Even a defendant cleared of
any wrongdoing will incur substantial defense costs to clear its name.
Finally, given how unsettled the law is in this area, even a firm with no mali-
cious intent may unwittingly incur liability. Claims that a particular exchange of
competitively sensitive information violates antitrust law are decided under the
rule of reason, which requires the court to consider a "number of factors" to
"divin[e] procompetitive or anticompetitive effects." 286 Canvassing the history
of such claims, the Second Circuit noted that "[t]he state of the law on this issue
was not always so clear." 287 Numerous commentators have noted that it is not
much clearer today.288 Given the risk that innocuous disclosures may give rise
to antitrust liability, it seems unwise policy to invite the proceeding and suffer
the attendant compliance costs and judgment risks associated with exchanging
competitively sensitive information.
V. CONCLUSION
Interconnection is a robust, competitive marketplace that has demonstrated a
continuous ability to adapt in response to consumers' growing appetites for In-
ternet-based products and services. Netflix's recent direct interconnection agree-
ments with Comcast and Verizon reflect a broader trend toward alternatives to
traditional transit service for delivery of significant volumes of Internet-based
traffic, and should not, alone, raise public policy concerns. Of course, even in
competitive markets, incentives for anticompetitive conduct exist, and following
Trinko, it is unclear whether traditional antitrust law is sufficient to prevent such
conduct in interconnection markets. To close this potential gap, the Commission
should assume a role as sector-specific competition authority, with the ability to
identify unfair interconnection business practices by networks and to remedy
those by compelling private negotiation between the parties.
To fulfill these new duties and increase transparency in interconnection mar-
kets, the Commission should take steps to study and report on interconnection
as part of its existing Section 706 reporting requirements. But it should reject
calls to mandate public disclosure of interconnection agreements, by broadband
providers or other networks. Economic literature and almost a century of anti-
trust jurisprudence warn of the potential unintended consequences of such a rule.
285 See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.a.
286 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
287 Id. at 198.
288 See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 230.
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Disclosure of competitively sensitive information can create opportunities for
tacit price collusion and even unilateral activity that raises prices to su-
pracompetitive levels. Even without any actual anticompetitive effects, disclo-
sure rules entail compliance costs and can lead to significant defense costs and
potential liability.
